Saturday, August 13, 2011

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the Respondents herein in C.No.J1/PR 105/2001 u/r 3 (b) dated 01.07.2003 awarding the punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect by the 4th Respondent herein and the order passed in suo motu review by the 3rd Respondent herein in Rc.No.9791/D1/2003 dated 23.12.2003 and the modified punishment order passed in appeal by the 2nd Respondent herein Rc.No.74959/Ap.I (1) / 2004 dated 16.04.2004 and the rejection order passed in the mercy petition by the 1st Respondent herein in Rc.No.174627/PR.I (1)/2004 dated 18.10.2004 and quash the same and consequently direct the Respondents herein to reinstate the Petitioner back to service with all benefits and with due regards to his seniority and pass further order.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:29.09.2008

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI

W.P.No.9171 of 2005


M.Murugan                                                           ... Petitioner

  Vs.

1.The Director General of Police
Chennai-4
2.The Additional Director General of Police (L & O)
Chennai-4.
3.The Deputy Inspector General of Police
Coimbatore Range
Coimbatore
4.The Superintendent of Police
   Coimbatore District
   Coimbatore.                 ... Respondents

Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the Respondents herein in C.No.J1/PR 105/2001 u/r 3 (b) dated 01.07.2003 awarding the punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect by the 4th Respondent herein and the order passed in suo motu review by the 3rd Respondent herein in Rc.No.9791/D1/2003 dated 23.12.2003 and the modified punishment order passed in appeal by the 2nd Respondent herein Rc.No.74959/Ap.I (1) / 2004 dated 16.04.2004 and the rejection order passed in the mercy petition by the 1st Respondent herein in Rc.No.174627/PR.I (1)/2004 dated 18.10.2004 and quash the same and consequently direct the Respondents herein to reinstate the Petitioner back to service with all benefits and with due regards to his seniority and pass further order.

For Petitioner       :Mr.R.S.Anand
  for M/s.Anand & Suryas

For Respondents   :Mr.N.SenthilKumar
  Addl.Govt.Pleader
 
     
ORDER
Petitioner seeks writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the various orders passed by the Respondents imposing punishment (compulsory retirement) upon the Petitioner and to seek the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner back into service with all benefits.
2.The brief facts, which lead to the filing of the Writ Petition are as follows:
(i)The Petitioner was appointed as Police Constable (Grade-II) in Madurai City Armed Reserve on 25.05.1988.  The Petitioner was promoted as Naiyak (Grade-I) Police Constable on 03.11.1995.  The Petitioner was transferred and posted to Coimbatore Armed Reserve Unit on 29.01.2001. After joining at Coimbatore, the Petitioner submitted a representation dated 07.04.2001 requesting to grant two months time to vacate the quarters.  His request was rejected and he was directed by Inspector and Assistant Commissioner, Armed Reserve, through Memos dated 07.04.2001 and 08.04.2001 instructing him to vacate the quarters.  Even after receipt of both memorandum, the Petitioner did not vacate the Police Quarters. Hence, as per instruction issued by the Commissioner of Police, Madurai City, in Memo No.T2/19464/2001 dated  09.04.2001, Petitioner was evicted from the Quarters by Police Officials on 10.04.2001, in Madurai City with the assistance of Village Administrative Officer, Madurai North.
(ii)According to the Petitioner he and his family members went to the ACP,AR, Madurai city to make representation about the forcible eviction. But according to the Respondents, the Petitioner and his family members observed "Fasting" in front of the room of ACP,AR Madurai city. A case was registered in Thallakulam P.S. Cr.No.387/2001 under Section 151 Cr.P.C. Hence, the Petitioner was dealt with a charge U/r. 3(b) of Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (D&A) Rules (for Short TNPSS), 1955 in P.R.No.105/01 of Coimbatore District for the delinquency committed by the delinquent viz., highly indisciplinary conduct in having refused to vacate the Government Police quarters even after his transfer from Madurai City and for having observed "fast" with his family members in front of Office of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Armed Reserve, Madurai City.
(iii)The Assistant Superintendent of Police, Tiruppur, who conducted oral enquiry has held the charge against the Petitioner as proved. Based on the findings of the enquiry officer, Petitioner was awarded a punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect by the 4th  Respondent on 01.07.2003.
(iv)On Suo motu review of the disposal of P.R.No.105/01, the  3rd  Respondent found that the punishment awarded to the Petitioner is disproportionate and hence, issued a Show Cause Notice dated 09.12.2003 as per R.15A(iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rules 1955 calling for explanation, from the Petitioner as to why the punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect awarded by the 4th Respondent should not be enhanced.  The Petitioner submitted his explanation on 19.12.2003. Thereafter, the 3rd  Respondent by proceedings C.No.D1/9791/2003 dated 23.12.2003, enhanced the punishment into that of removal from service.  On Appeal, the 2nd Respondent modified the punishment of removal from service into that of Compulsory Retirement of Service by Proceedings C.No.4959/AP.I(1)/2004 dated 14.06.2004.  The Mercy Petition filed before 1st Respondent dated 18.10.2004 was also rejected. Alleging that the order of punishment of compulsory retirement is excessive and disproportionate writ petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order of compulsory retirement.
3.The Respondents have filed counter stating ASP, Tiruppur was appointed as enquiry officer and after conducting oral enquiry, enquiry officer has held the charge against Petitioner as proved. Based on the findings of enquiry officer 4th Respondent has passed the punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect. According to the Respondents the delinquency committed by the Petitioner was grave nature punishment of postponement of increment for two years was enhanced in to that of removal from service by the 3rd Respondent. On appeal 2nd Respondent has modified the punishment as that of compulsory retirement in the proceedings C.No.74951/Ap-1(1)/04, dated 16.04.2004. According to the Respondents the enquiry was held in accordance with rule 15 A (1) (iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rule 1955 and observed principles of natural justice. According to Respondents delinquency committed by the Petitioner was grave nature, therefore punishment of postponement of compulsory retirement is commensurate with gravity of the charge.
4.Challenging the impugned order learned counsel for the Petitioner inter-alia made following submissions:
As per existing procedure if any person failed to vacate the quarters even after sufficient time after transfer to any district penalty alone can be charged at the prevailing rate of rent and while so forcible eviction from quarters is arbitrary and inhuman.
Petitioner and his wife, children went to represent to the ACP, AR, Madurai and since ACP was not available they were waiting there and while so a false case has been registered against the Petitioner as if he was fasting in front of the office of the ACP.
In any event, the criminal case in Cr.No.387/2001 u/s 151 Cr.P.C has ended in acquittal.
Without any justifiable reason the punishment of stoppage of increment for two years has been enhanced as dismissal from service.
5.The learned Additional Government Pleader, Mr.N.Senthilkumar, has submitted that delinquency held proved against the Petitioner was serious in nature and the punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect awarded by the 4th Respondent was enhanced to removal from service. Invoking rule 15 A (1) (iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rule 1955 and the same was modified as compulsory retirement by 2nd Respondent. The learned Addl.Govt.Pleader further submitted that the impugned punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate or harsh warranting interference.
6.The Petitioner was transferred to Coimbatore on his request on 29.01.2001. Immediately on his relief from Madurai AR, the Petitioner  ought to have vacated the Government Police quarters in Madurai. Inspite of sufficient time given to him the Petitioner did not vacate the quarters. Petitioner has submitted a petition dated 07.04.2001 requesting two months time to vacate the quarters and his request was rejected. Through memo dated 07.04.2001 and 08.04.2001 Petitioner was directed to vacate Police quarters. Since the Petitioner did not vacate Police quarters, it is stated that the Petitioner and his family members were evicted with the help of Village Administrative Officer. The Petitioner and his family members are alleged to have observed "Fasting" in front of office of the ACP regarding which criminal  was registered in Cr.No.387/2001 u/s 151 Cr.PC.
7.The following charge was framed against the Petitioner:
"Highly indisciplinary conduct in having refused to vacate the Government Police quarters Madurai City Armed Reserve even after his transfer from Madurai City and observed fast with his family members in front of Office of Assistant Commissioner of Police Armed Reserve, Madurai City on 10.04.2001 at 12.30 hrs. and there by involved in criminal case in Cr.No.387/2001 u/s 151 Cr. PC of Thallakulam P.S.Madurai City".
8.Enquiry Officer-ASP Tiruppur who conducted oral enquiry has held that the charges against the Petitioner is proved. Based on the findings of enquiry officer, petitioner was awarded punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect by the 4th Respondent on 01.07.2003, which was acknowledged by the Petitioner on 10.07.2003. Petitioner did not prefer any appeal against the said punishment.
9.Under Rule 15 A(1) (iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rule 1955 , the appellate authority has power of Suo-motu to enhance the punishment invoking  Rule 15 A(1) (iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rule 1955. 3rd Respondent has enhanced the punishment as removal from service by the order dated 23.12.2003. In the appeal preferred by the Petitioner to the 2nd Respondent the punishment was modified as compulsory retirement.
10.Learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr.R.S.Anand has contended that the basis for the charge is the alleged misconduct of fast regarding which criminal case was registered in Cr.No.387/2001. Though the alleged occurrence was in 2001, Thallakulam police did not file charge sheet in the said case Cr.No.387/2001. Because of        non-filing of charge sheet, court has closed the case u/s.468(2) Cr.P.C. on 27.09.2005. There is no inflexible rule that the finding of a criminal court is conclusive upon administrative authorities if it is technical acquittal not on merits, the administrative authority may conceivably punish on the same facts. The question calling for consideration is when no charge sheet was filed against the Petitioner whether the Petitioner can still be dealt with sternly. The crux of the charge is that the Petitioner has not vacated the quarters even after sufficient time being given after transferred to Coimbatore and in protest of the eviction Petitioner and his family members observed fasting.
11.Placing reliance upon 1992 (4) SCC 54 (State of Punjab & Others v. Ram Singh, X-Constable), learned AGP has contended that Petitioner being part of disciplinary force was expected to maintain strict discipline and the punishment imposed by the Appellate Authority cannot be said to be disproportionate.
12.The Petitioner is alleged to have protested against the eviction. To substantiate the charges that the Petitioner has not vacated the quarters and that he protested the eviction, on behalf of prosecution   PW1-Inspector Mokkaraj, PW2-Inspector Jeyapaul, PW3-Village Administrative Officer Ravindran, PW4-Sub Inspector Balamurugan,PW5-Palanisamy, PW6-Sub Inspector Kumar and PW7-Sub Inspector Kanakaraj were examined. All of them have spoken about eviction of the Petitioner and his family from the quarters and that the Petitioner has raised voice at the time of eviction. In his evidence PWS1 and 2 have also stated that Petitioner refused to sign in the list and Petitioner and his family observed fasting in front of the office of ACP. Thallakulam police have registered the case in Cr.No.387/2001 u/s 151 Cr.P.C. Upon analysis of evidence, the enquiry officer held that charges against the Petitioner are proved. Based upon evidence, enquiry officer concluded that the Petitioner refused to vacate the house and therefore steps have been taken to evict the Petitioner, resisting the same the Petitioner protested.
13.As rightly observed by the Disciplinary Authority that the observance of fasting is indiscipline conduct on the part of delinquent.  Learned counsel for the Petitioner tried to persuade the court that the charges framed against the Petitioner and conclusion of the enquiry officer are perverse. It is relevant to note that as against the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority/4th Respondent, petitioner himself has not preferred any appeal. While so, it is not open to the Petitioner to challenge the findings of the enquiry officer and finding of guilt.
14.With a view to give opportunity to the Petitioner to correct himself, the 4th Respondent has taken a lenient view and imposed punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect.
15.Invoking  Rule 15 A(1) (iii) of TNPSS (D&A) Rule 1955 the 3rd Respondent issued show cause notice for suo motu enhancing the punishment the 3rd Respondent observed that the misconduct is very serious in nature and chosen to impose punishment of dismissal from service. In my considered view, 3rd Respondent did not keep in view the facts and circumstance of the case. On the early hours of 10.04.2001, the Petitioner's wife and three female children were forcibly evicted from police quarters. Though the Petitioner is a part of disciplinary force basically he is a human having family bonds. Seeing his wife and children in the streets, the Petitioner must have been mentally disturbed in which the Petitioner might have retorted to the same by raising his voice. In fact before the enquiry officer the Petitioner has explained his conduct as in the following:-





Vernacular (TAMIL) Portion Deleted





16.In such circumstance raising protest by observing fasting before office of ACP cannot be said to be such a serious misconduct imposing extreme punishment of removal from service modified as compulsory retirement. It is fairly well settled that in service matters, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision.
17.Normally exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the court will not go into the quantum of punishment. However if extreme punishment is imposed without any justification the High Court in its writ jurisdiction would certainly interfere. Unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, High Court would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment.
18.In (2007) 2 MLJ 278 (SC), [Union of India and others v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari], the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"15. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards.  In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator.  The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
"16. To put differently, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference.  Further to shorten litigations, it may in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof.  In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed."
"17. The above position was recently reiterated in Union of India and another v. K.G.Soni 2006 (6) Supreme 389 : 2006 III LLJ 802 (SC) following Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and others v. Munna Lal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584 : (2005) 10 SCC 84 : 2005-I-LLJ-730 (SC)."
Of course being part of Disciplinary force the Petitioner was expected to maintain strict discipline. But does the conduct of the Petitioner warrant imposing extreme penalty of dismissal from service modified as compulsory retirement is the point for consideration.
19.The Penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. Any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The penalty of compulsory retirement for protesting against the forcible eviction is disproportionate and excessive. In my considered view, the order of 4th Respondent imposing punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect is just and reasonable and the same has to be restored.
20.In the result the order of 2nd Respondent in Rc.No.74959/Ap.I (1) / 2004 dated 16.04.2004 imposing punishment of compulsory retirement is set aside and this writ petition is partly allowed.
The order of 4th Respondent in C.No.J1/PR 105/2001 u/r 3 (b)dated 01.07.2003 awarding punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect is restored;
The Petitioner is ordered to be reinstated into service within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of  this order;
Punishment of postponement of increment for two years without cumulative effect shall start from the date of Petitioner's rejoining.
Period during which Petitioner was out of service shall be treated as leave on loss of pay. Petitioner shall not be entitled to any salary during that period. However, that period shall be taken into account for continuity of service.

                   




kpr

To

1.The Director General of Police
Chennai-4
2.The Additional Director General of Police (L & O)
Chennai-4.
3.The Deputy Inspector General of Police
Coimbatore Range,Coimbatore
4.The Superintendent of Police
   Coimbatore District,
   Coimbatore



Petitioner seeks Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to pay Pension according to the regulation of Pension scheme in view of Rule 2 (ze), 2 (zea), 35 (i) and 35 (ii) of Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:     26.11.2008

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI

W.P.Nos. 32502, 36782, 37150, 37197, 37739, 36764/2003 and 1421, 8809 & 11180/2004



V.Kannappan and 19 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.32502/2003

A.Sundaram and 249 others                          ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.36782/2003

M.Sevuganchetty ... Petitioner in    W.P.No.37150/2003

S.Alagappan and 262 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.37197/2003

S.Thirunaukkarasu and 48 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.37739/2003

K.R.Chandran and 66 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.1421/2004

M.Jeyapal and 26 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.8809/2004

Kalyani and 39 others ... Petitioners in    W.P.No.11180/2004

D.G.Ragavendra. ... Petitioner in    W.P.No.36764/2003



  Vs.
1. Additional Secretary,
    Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs,
    (Banking and Insurance),
    No.235, Jeevandeep Buildings,
    Sansad Marg-1,
    New Delhi-110 001.

2.Managing Director and
Chief Executive Officer,
ICICI Bank Limited,
Corporate Office, ICICI Towers,
Bandra Kuria Complex,
Bundra East, Mumbai-400 051.

3.Assistant General Manager,
ICICI Bank Limited,
Corporate Office, Karumuthu Nilliam,
No.192, Mount Road,
Chennai-6. ... Respondents


Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd Respondent Bank to pay Pension as per the scheme viz., Bank of Madura Pension Regulation, 1995.

For Petitioners        : Mr. T.R.Rajagopal,
     Senior Counsel
       for
     Mr.L.J.Krishnamurthy

For Respondents    :  Mr. A.L.Somayaji,
     Senior Counsel
       for
     P.L.Narayanan

-----


  COMMON ORDER

Petitioner seeks Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to pay Pension according to the regulation of Pension scheme in view of Rule 2 (ze), 2 (zea), 35 (i) and 35 (ii) of Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995.

2. Briefly stated case of the Petitioners is as follows:-
(i) Petitioners were originally employed in Bank of Madura and served for more than 20 years in various Branches of Bank of Madura.  During 1995, Bank of Madura sent a circular to implement Pension scheme of the employees of Bank of Madura and along with its regulations.  Again another Circular dated 01.2.1996 was issued calling for options from the employees to opt for Pension scheme.  Petitioners who were in service on erstwhile Bank of Madura have not opted for Pension scheme.  Petitioners and some of the Bank employees were in a dilemma whether to opt for Pension scheme or to continue to contribute Provident Fund scheme.  According to the Petitioners, they were under the impression that at the time of retirement, a sizable amount would be paid by way of contribution to the Provident Fund.

(ii) Bank of Madura merged with ICICI Bank on 10.3.2001.  An order was passed for Amalgamations u/s.44(a) of Banking Regulations Act, 1941.  Bank of Madura merged with ICICI Bank and as per Clauses 9 and 10 of the Order of Amalgamations, Petitioners became employees of the transferee Bank without any break or interference in service.
(iii) Petitioners have averred that under threat and coercion employees of erstwhile Bank of Madura have been asked to go on VRS and were threatened with lot of consequences.   ICICI Bank had launched Early Retirement Option (ERO) 2003 on 17.6.2003 and the scheme was open during July 2003.  According to ICICI Bank, Bank of Madura employees who have opted for pension during 1995-1996 and have completed 20 years of service only would be eligible for Pension benefits under ERO-2003 scheme.
(iv) Case of the Petitioners is that employees who have opted for Pension under ERO scheme fall within the definition of Rule 2 (ze) and 35 (i) & 35(ii) of Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations and are eligible for Pension under ERO scheme.  But ICICI Bank had refused to pay Pension to those employees who retired on 31.7.2003 on the ground that they ceased to be the employees of ICICI Bank and therefore, they have no right to make an application for Pension.  Further, case of the Petitioners is that ICICI cannot refuse Pension to the Petitioners stating that Employees/Petitioners have not opted for Pension during 1995-1996 in the erstwhile Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations and therefore, Petitioners seek Writ of Mandamus directing the 2nd Respondent Bank to pay Pension as per the Pension Regulations of 1995.

3. Denying the averments in the Petitions, 2nd and 3rd Respondents have filed counter stating that Petitioners on their own volition have opted for Early Retirement Option Scheme, 2003 introduced by the Respondent Bank  for the welfare of the employees and Petitioners have received all retiral benefits viz., employees and employers matching contribution to P.F. with upto date interest and gratuity as specifically mentioned in ERO-2003.  Erstwhile Bank of Madura introduced a Pension scheme called Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995 in line with Banking Industry.

4. Respondent Bank  averred that in response to the opportunities given by the erstwhile Bank of Madura, out of 2824 employees ( as of 31.10.1993), 1044 employees had exercised their option within the prescribed period.  However, Writ Petitioners have not availed those opportunities to exercise their options for Pension.  According to ICICI Bank, all employees who are eligible to opt for ERO are the employees who have already opted for Pension and have completed 20 years of service only would be eligible for Pension and P.F. cannot be surrendered in lieu of Pension.

5. Stand of ICICI Bank is that Bank of Madura employees who have opted for Pension and have completed 20 years of service only would be eligible for Pension benefits.  It is further averred that all ERO-2003 optees were aware that in case they have not opted for Pension during 1995-1996, they would not be eligible for Pension and as such the decision to opt for ERO-2003 was a conscious and well informed decision taken by the Petitioners.  2nd Respondent ICICI Bank has taken a stand that Writ Petitioners having failed to exercise their option during 1995-1996 and decided to continue under PF and having failed to exercise option for Pension during 1995-1996 are not eligible for Pension.  Stand of ICICI Bank is that Petitioners would be eligible for benefits only under ERO-2003 scheme and are not eligible for Pension.

6. Contending that demand of Pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace and that it is a matter vested right, Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that Writ can be issued even against a private body.  It was further argued that where exercise of power is arbitrary and unfair even in the area of contractual obligation, Writ can be issued.

7. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that denial of Pension on the ground that they have not opted for Pension during 1995-1996 under Bank of Madura Pension Scheme is arbitrary and unfair.

8. Mr. A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents 2 and 3 has contended that Writ of Mandamus is pre-eminent public law remedy and not available as a remedy against the private bodies. It was further argued that under Art.226 of Constitution, power has to be exercised only when public duty involved.  It was further urged that ICICI bank is a private Bank not carrying on any public duty and the Banking activity cannot be claimed as discharging public duties and therefore Writ Petitions are not maintainable.

9. Petitioners are the erstwhile employees of Bank of Madura.  Bank of Madura merged with ICICI Bank on 10.3.2001.  After merger, Petitioners continued to be the employees of transferee bank without any break in service.
10. Evolution of Pensionary benefits in Banking Sector:-
Basically, there were two types of retiral benefits existed before introduction of Pension in Banking Industry  (i) Contributory PF;  (ii) Gratuity.  There was consistent demand for Pension as third retiral benefit.  After lot of deliberation in respect of nationalised banks, Government of India agreed for Pension as second benefit in lieu of Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) and not as third benefit.  Accordingly, Pension Regulations came into existence in 1995 giving effect retrospectively from 01.11.1993.

11. Post introduction of Pension Regulations in 1995 effective November 1 1993, retiral benefits in banking sector thus changed to:-
(i) PF without matching contribution; (ii) Pension (out of Management Contribution to PF, an amount equivalent to hitherto Management contribution to PF) and (iii) Gratuity.

12. Resultantly, all the new joinees on or after 01.11.1993 were covered in Pension Regulations by design.  Since, new Pension scheme has brought change in the retirals, option was given to the existing employees as of 31.10.1993 ( i.e. the date just prior to the effective date of implementation of Pension regulations), employees were afforded an opportunity to exercise option to decide within the time frame whether to continue to CPF and gratuity or to move to PF without matching contribution and gratuity.

13. All the Petitioners who were in services of erstwhile Bank of Madura as on 31.10.1993 were afforded opportunity to exercise their option as to whether they want to be governed by retirals i.e. CPF and gratuity or to avail PF without matching contribution from the employer, Pension and Gratuity as was done in the Banking Industry.  The eligible employees allowed to exercise their option within the period of 6 months commencing from 25.1.1995 (Vide Circular No.CO.STF.94/94-95) and subsequently the said period for exercising option was extended to May 1996 on two occasions.  Writ Petitioners have not availed the opportunity and exercised option for Pension.  According to the Bank, Petitioners on their own volition preferred to continue with the Provident Fund Scheme.

14. Early Retirement Option (ERO) Scheme:-
ICICI Bank introduced ERO-2003 scheme for all employees of the Bank including the employees of erstwhile Bank of Madura Limited, for the welfare of the employees with a view to give soft exit option to those employees.  Stand of ICICI Bank is that all employees are eligible to opt for ERO-2003. Further stand of the Bank is that the employees who have already opted for pension and have completed 20 years of service only would be eligible for Pension and PF cannot be surrendered in lieu of Pension.

15. According to ICICI Bank, Regulation 35 eligibility criteria for employees to receive Pension benefits superannuation are (i) employees should have already opted for Pension  as enumerated in Regulation 2 (ze); 35 and (ii) and employees should have completed 20 years of service.

16. Briefly the issue involved is whether Pensionary benefits under ERO scheme is available only to those who have already opted for Pension in 1995.  Contentious issues between the parties revolve around interpretation of ERO-2003 and Regulations 2 (ze), 2 (ze a) and 35 (ii) which we would would avert shortly.

17. Albeit stand that Petitioners are not eligible for Pension, Bank has mainly raised objection as to maintainability of the Writ Petitions.


18. Maintainability of Writ Petitions:-
Onbehalf of ICICI Bank, Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel mainly contended that Writ Petitions are not maintainable, since Writ Petition will not lie against the Respondent Bank which is a Public Limited Company registered under the provisions of Companies Act which is neither created nor governed by any statute.  It was mainly argued that Respondent Bank  being a Private Sector Bank is neither a State nor an instrumentality of a State within the meaning of Art.12 of Constitution of India and hence, Petitioners cannot invoke Writ jurisdiction.  To substantiate his contention that Writ Petition under Art.226 of Constitution is not maintainable against Private Sector Bank, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents heavily placed reliance upon AIR 2003 SC 4325 [Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and others].

19. Placing reliance upon (1983) 1 SCC 305 [D.S.Nakara and others v. Union of India] and  1984 (Supp) SCC 410 [Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others], Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Writ Petitioners submitted that payment of Pension is welfare measure wherein retiral benefits is allowed and Respondent Bank  though a Private Sector Bank is amenable to Writ jurisdiction in payment of Pension.  Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners mainly contended that Payment of Pension is a "public function" amounting to discharge of public duty and therefore, when there is violation of that public duty by arbitrary act of the Bank, Writ of Mandamus can be issued even against the Private body.  Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that when Private body performs such statutory obligations, Writ can be issued against private bodies also.  It was further urged that form of the body is not very much relevant and what is relevant is nature of duty imposed on the body.

20. In Federal Bank's case  [AIR 2003 SC 4325], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elaborately considered the question of maintainability of Writ Petition against Private Sector Bank and referring to Ajay Hasia's case [AIR 1981 SC 487], the Supreme Court has laid down the position as to the maintainability of the Writ Petition:
"17. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.

21. Observing that the concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a Corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case, it would have to be decided on consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression 'authority' in Art.12, in Ajay Hasia's case [AIR 1981 SC 487], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following tests:

(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.

(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.

(3) It may also be a relevant factor  whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected.

(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.


(6) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.

22. On behalf of the Respondent Bank , learned Senior Counsel mainly argued that ICICI Bank is a private Bank carrying on Banking business as a scheduled Bank and cannot be termed as an instrumentality of a State or agency of the Government carrying on statutory public duties.  Contending that Writ Petition is not maintainable, learned Senior Counsel heavily placed reliance upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraphs 32  of Federal Bank's case:
32. For the discussion held above, in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as a scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person may be amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We dont find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking. Merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline, do not confer any such status upon the company nor put any such obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Present is a case of disciplinary action being taken against its employee by the appellant Bank. The respondents service with the Bank stands terminated. The action of the Bank was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank. That being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

23. Federal Bank's case does not totally exclude jurisdiction of High Court under Art.226 of Constitution.  In the said decision, Supreme Court did refer to certain situations where Writ would lie to compel the Private bodies to perform statutory obligations.   Apposite to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Para-26.
26. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with by all concerned including the private companies. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment, say the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispenses with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and has issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance with or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to.

24. Contending that Writ jurisdiction could be invoked only when action involves discharging of public duty, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Bank  placed reliance upon the decision of Full Bench of this Court in 2004 (3) CTC 1 [P.Pitchumani etc. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. rep. by its Managing Director, 10, Jawahar Road, Madurai-2].  The said decision relates to transfer of employees of ICICI Bank and various other Private companies.  Observing that dismissals, transfers and matters concerning service conditions of employees are governed by Industrial Disputes Act and observing that  violation under Industrial Disputes Act which involve public duties are not amenable to Writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution of India, Full Bench of this Court has dismissed all the Writ Petitions.  Those Writ Petitions arise out of transfers which is incidental to service conditions of employees governed by Industrial Disputes Act which have to be adjudicated by Fora created by Statute and therefore, First Bench of this Court has held that those Writ Petitions are not maintainable.

25. Yet another decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Bank   2007 II LLJ 941 [S. Sundaram  and others v. ICICI Bank Limited rep. by its Chairman & MD., Mumbai and another].  In the said decision, learned single Judge has taken the view that Writ Petition against private Bank  ICICI Bank is not maintainable.  In Sundaram's  case, payment of Pension was not in dispute.  Only rate of Pension payable to Writ Petitioner was in issue.  In such circumstances, learned single Judge has taken the view that there is no statutory obligation on the part of the Respondent Bank  to pay Pension as demanded by the Petitioners.  Having not made out the case of factual aspects, learned single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition both on merits as well as on the point of maintainability of the Writ Petition.

26. To substantiate his contention that Writ Petitions are not maintainable, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Bank  has also placed reliance upon the decision MANU/TN/0056/2008 [ICICI Bank Limited rep. by its Sr. Vice President-HR v. Lakshminarayanan  W.A.No.2245/2002 decided on 04.1.2008].  In the said decision, interpretation of Regulation 29 of Pension Regulations was in issue.  Copiously, referring to Federal Bank's case, Division Bench of this Court has held that Writ Petition for Pension is not maintainable.

27. Regulation 29 of Pension Regulations relates to "Pension on "Voluntary Retirement" of those who retired on or after 01.11.1993.  The said Writ Petitioner having been retired on 01.2.1992, pursuant to his notice to ICICI Bank dated 02.11.1991 and Division Bench held that case of the Writ Petitioner is not covered under Regulation 29 and therefore, he does not come within the definition of 'retirement' under Regulation 2 (w) (b) of Pension Regulations.  Observing that Writ Petitioner cannot claim benefit prescribed under Regulation 35, nor he falls within the meaning of 'Retirement' under Regulation 2 (w) (d) of Pension Regulations, Division Bench has taken the view that Writ Petition is not maintainable.

28. The ratio of  the above  decision relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent Bank  cannot be applied to the present batch of Writ Petitions wherein denial of Pension to number of employees is the subject matter in issue.  Right of Pension is denied to numerous employees allegedly under mis-interpretation of Regulations 2 (ze), 2 (ze a) and 35 (ii).  It is well settled position that Pension protection is a measure of social security for the aged and disabled.

29. Observing that Pension is neither bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer but as payment for past service rendered, in D.S.Nagara's case [(1993) 1 SCC 305], Supreme Court has held as follows:-
29. Summing up it can be said with confidence that pension is not only compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension also has a broader significance, in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which inheres economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and, therefore, one is required to fall back on savings. One such saving in kind is when you give your best in the hey-day of life to your employer, in days of invalidity, economic security by way of periodical payment is assured. The term has been judicially defined as a stated allowance or stipend made in consideration of past service or a surrender of rights or emoluments to one retired from service. Thus the pension payable to a government employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and therefore can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation or for service rendered. In one sentence one can say that the most practical raison detre for pension is the inability to provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and avoid unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing to fall back upon.
31. From the discussion three things emerge: (i) that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer and that it creates a vested right subject to 1972 Rules which are statutory in character because they are enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and clause (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution; (ii) that the pension is not an ex-gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered; and (iii) it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice to those who in the hey-day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in lurch. It must also be noticed that the quantum of pension is a certain percentage correlated to the average emoluments drawn during last three years of service reduced to 10 months under liberalised pension scheme. Its payment is dependent upon an additional condition of impeccable behaviour even subsequent to retirement, that is, since the cessation of the contract of service and that it can be reduced or withdrawn as a disciplinary measure.
36. Having set out clearly the society which we propose to set up, the direction in which the State action must move, the welfare State which we propose to build up, the constitutional goal of setting up a socialist State and the assurance in the Directive Principles of State Policy especially of security in old age at least to those who have rendered useful service during their active years, it is indisputable, nor was it questioned, that pension as a retirement benefit is in consonance with and in furtherance of the goals of the Constitution. The goals for which pension is paid themselves give a fillip and push to the policy of setting up a welfare State because by pension the socialist goal of security of cradle to grave is assured at least when it is mostly needed and least available, namely, in the fall of life.

30. Referring to D.S.Nagara's case [(1993) 1 SCC 305], in 1984 (Supp) SCC 410 [Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and others] which is a case of non-payment of Pension despite Court's order, Supreme Court has held as follows:-
2. A Constitution Bench of this Court in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India  (1983) 2 SCR 165 : (1983) 1 SCC 305:1983 SCC (L&S) 145 : 1983 UPSC 263: (1983) 1 LLJ 104 posed three questions: What is a pension?. What are the goals of pension? and what public interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to serve? and proceeded to answer the same inter alia that Pension is not only a compensation for service rendered in the past but it has a broader significance in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which inheres economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and therefore one is required to fall back on savings. Article 41 obligates the State within the limits of its economic capacity and development to make effective provisions amongst others for assistance in case of old age, sickness and disablement. Pension provisions are to some extent the legislative response to the constitutional expectation. But this legal conundrum would provide a paper guarantee if the statutory right to pension is not translated into action in a reasonably short time on retirement leaving the employee to penury and economic destitution.

31. Article 226 does not state that the Writ will issue only to a public official.  It uses the expression "any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government ....".  The question as to whether a Writ will issue against non-Governmental entities has been the subject matter of a number of cases.  It has been held that the person or authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need not be a public official or an official body.  A mandamus could be issued to a company or an official of a society to compel them to carry out their statutory obligation or fulfill public responsibilities.[Vide AIR 1969 SC 1306 : (1969) 1 SCC 585 (Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A.Immanual]

32. The term 'authority' used in Article 226 in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12.  The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.  They may cover any other person or body performing public duty.  The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant.  What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body.  The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party.  No matter by what means the duty is imposed.  If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.  It may be pointed out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute.  The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of the bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water tight compartment.  It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances.  Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found.  Technicality should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226.
33. In (2002) 4 SCC 638 : AIR 2002 SC 1598 [Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R.Apparao], the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion.  They must be exercised along the recognized lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations.  The expression 'for any other purpose' in Article 226 makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive yet the courts must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters."

34. The entire law under the subject has been discussed in Binny Limited case, [(2005) 6 SCC 657], wherein the Supreme Court held that Art.226 could be invoked against a private body if it is discharging public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty cast on the private body.  Either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial but nevertheless there must be public law element in such  action.  Observing that Writ of Mandamus under Art.226 though pre-eminently a public law remedy and is available against the private body or person, Supreme Court succinctly laid down the position in Paragraphs 9,10 and 11 as follows:-
9. The superior courts supervisory jurisdiction of judicial review is invoked by an aggrieved party in myriad cases. High Courts in India are empowered under Article 226 of the Constitution to exercise judicial review to correct administrative decisions and under this jurisdiction the High Court can issue to any person or authority, any direction or order or writs for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. The jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is very wide. However, it is an accepted principle that this is a public law remedy and it is available against a body or person performing a public law function....
10. The writ of mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or a statutory duty. The prerogative remedy of mandamus has long provided the normal means of enforcing the performance of public duties by public authorities. Originally, the writ of mandamus was merely an administrative order from the Sovereign to subordinates. In England, in early times, it was made generally available through the Court of Kings Bench, when the Central Government had little administrative machinery of its own. Early decisions show that there was free use of the writ for the enforcement of public duties of all kinds, for instance against inferior tribunals which refused to exercise their jurisdiction or against municipal corporations which did not duly hold elections, meetings, and so forth. In modern times, the mandamus is used to enforce statutory duties of public authorities. The courts always retained the discretion to withhold the remedy where it would not be in the interest of justice to grant it. It is also to be noticed that the statutory duty imposed on the public authorities may not be of discretionary character. A distinction had always been drawn between the public duties enforceable by mandamus that are statutory and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by ordinary contractual remedies such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration.....
11. Judicial review is designed to prevent the cases of abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. However, under our Constitution, Article 226 is couched in such a way that a writ of mandamus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority must be discharging a public function and the decision sought to be corrected or enforced must be in discharge of a public function. The role of the State expanded enormously and attempts have been made to create various agencies to perform the governmental functions. Several corporations and companies have also been formed by the Government to run industries and to carry on trading activities. These have come to be known as public sector undertakings. However, in the interpretation given to Article 12 of the Constitution, this Court took the view that many of these companies and corporations could come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. At the same time, there are private bodies also which may be discharging public functions. It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions when they are being discharged by a purely private authority. A body is performing a public function when it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest......"

35. By analysis of the above decisions, it emerges that powers under Art.226 of Constitution is very wide and powers are to be exercised by applying Constitutional provisions and if there is violation of fundamental rights or statutory provisions or arbitrariness in discharging the public duty when there is public law element involved.  Of course, in the matter of employment of workers by private companies on the basis of contracts entered between them, Court's have been reluctant to exercise power of judicial review and whenever powers were exercised as against the private employers it was solely done based on public law element involved therein.

36. In the present case, it is the case of payment of Pension to number of employees.  Payment of Pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet will of the employer.  As held by the Apex Court, it is the proprietary right under Art. 31(1) and 19 (1)(f) of Constitution.  It is the measure of social security. Though Pension is often described as deferred portion of compensation over the past service, it is in fact in the nature of social security plan to provide for evening life of superannuated employee.  Such social security plan are concerned with socio-economic requirements of the Constitution.

37. Payment of Pension is a public duty performed by Respondent Bank .  This is all the more so, when interest and right of number of employees are involved.  Writ Petitioners have made certain serious averments regarding circumstances in which they opted to go on retirement under ERO-2003 Scheme.  The issue involved is question of interpretation of Pension Regulations and when arbitrariness is alleged against the 2nd Respondent Bank, contention regarding non-maintainability of the Writ Petitions cannot be countenanced.  Applying the ratio of decisions of the Supreme Court in Binny Limited Case, Writ Petitions are maintainable against the 2nd Respondent Bank which is a private body but in the area of payment of Pension discharging public function.  ICICI Bank though a Private exercise Public function when it discharges its duties in payment of Pension which is in the nature of social security plan.



38. Entitlement of Pensionary benefits under VRS Scheme:-
Drawing Court's attention to Regulations 2 (ze), 2 (zea) and 3 (9)  (a) to (c) and 35 (ii), learned Senior Counsel Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan has submitted that erstwhile Bank of Madura and ICICI Bank are unique in nature with regard to the option of Pension.  It was contended that in other Banks, there was no provision similar to Regulations 2 (ze) and 35 (ii) found in the Respondent Bank  scheme.

39. It was submitted that as per Regulation 2 (m) of Bank of Madura Employees Pension Scheme, permanent employee is alone eligible for the scheme and not a temporary employee.  The permanent employee must have completed twenty five years of service and opted for the scheme.  The time for opting the scheme is given in Regulations 2 (zea) and 35(ii).  It was therefore contended that  Petitioners  squarely come under the rules and are entitled to the Pension.  It was further submitted that Petitioners have not received the benefits of ERO-2003 in full as stated by the Respondents.


40. Contention of ICICI is that erstwhile Bank of Madura introduced a Pension scheme called Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995 (for short BME Regulations) in line with the Banking Industry.  Pension scheme was compulsorily made applicable to those employees who joined on or after 01.11.1993.  Those employees who were on the Rolls of the Bank as of 31.10.1993 were given an opportunity to exercise their option for Pension as per the Respondents' Bank Circular No.CO.STF.94/95 dated 25.1.1995 within a period of six months.  Subsequently, the same was extended on two occasions.

41. In response to the opportunities given by the erstwhile Bank of Madura, out of 2824 employees (on the roll as of October 31, 1993), 1044 employees had exercised their option within the prescribed period.  It is stated that the Writ Petitioners have not availed those opportunities to exercise their option for pension even after the extended period and have chosen to remain and continue to be the member of the Provident Fund.  Case of ICICI Bank is that having not exercised the option within the stipulated time during 1995-1996, Petitioners are not entitled to maintain the Writ Petition.


42. Case of ICICI Bank is that having not chosen to exercise their option, Petitioners are not entitled to claim Pensionary benefits and cannot maintain the Writ Petitions.  It is the further case of ICICI Bank that after the expiry of period of exercising options by 30.05.1996, the Bank has not given any further opportunity to those employees to opt for Pension.

43. Learned Senior counsel for the Respondents has submitted that Pension scheme was extended to those employees who opted under VRS in the year 1993-1994.  Stand of the Bank is that at the time of introduction of Pension scheme in the Respondent Bank  in the year 1995, it was decided that those employees of the Respondent Bank  who had already retired under VRS Scheme introduced by the Respondent Bank  in the year 1993 & 1994 may be given the benefit of Pension provided (i) those employees should have completed 20 years of service and (ii) they exercise option for Pension within 60 days from the date of notice to be sent to them with format of such option.  Therefore, according to Respondent Bank Pension Scheme was extended to those employees who opted under VRS in the year 1993 and 1994.


44. It was further argued that Clause 2 (ze) is not applicable to the Petitioners who have not exercised their option for Pension.  To put it shortly, stand of ICICI is that Regulation 2 (ze) was introduced with a view to safe guard the interest of those who have exercised their options for Pension and retired in 1993-1994.

45. Insofar as, ERO-2003, it was submitted that all the employees were put on information that they would be entitled for the benefits provided under the Scheme including medical insurance.  It was further argued that by Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),  it was made known that all employees are eligible to opt for ERO-2003 and that only those employees who have already opted for Pension in 1995 only would be eligible for Pension.  It was also argued that Writ Petitioners (excepting Writ Petitioners in W.P.No.11180/2004 & 36764/2003) have opted retirement under ERO-2003 and that Writ Petitioners have received the entire ERO-2003 benefits and they were informed in advance and that they are entitled to the benefits only as per ERO-2003 Scheme together with all their terminal benefits.  Learned Senior Counsel would submit that Petitioners who have opted under ERO-2003 Scheme were paid the eligible benefits under ERO-2003 Scheme.

46. Plea of ICICI Bank is that case of Writ Petitioners would not fall within the ambit of Clause 2 (ze) is  wholly devoid of merits.  The merits of the contention revolves around interpretation of Regulations 2 (ze), 2 (zea) and 35 (ii).

47. Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations:-
Chapter II contains application and eligibility of Pension.  Clause 3 (9) (a) to (c) deals with VRS which reads as under:-
"3 (9) (a) :  Retired under VRS as defined in Regulation 2 (ze);
(b) :   exercise an option in writing within the    stipulated time as contained in Regulation 35 to become member of the Fund;
and
(c) : refund within thirty days from the date of superannuation the entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund and interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund Account till the date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank as contained in Regulation 35."

48. Clause 2 (ze) of Regulation which deals with 'VRS' reads as under:-
" Regulation 2 (ze) : 'VRS' means Bank of Madura Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme enclosed to the circular CO.STF:39/94-95 dated July 21, 1994, or any other specific scheme that may be implemented in future bringing such scheme under the definition of this regulation. The employees who have completed 20 years of service in the bank and who have retired subsequent to the expiry of the scheme mentioned in the Circular CO:GM:CIR:2/93-94 dated May 20, 1993, and who were extended the additional benefits in addition to the normal retirement benefits shall be deemed and considered to have retired under VRS."

49. Two conditions are pre-requisites for VRS Regulation 2 (ze):-
Employees who have completed 20 years of service in the Bank and  who have retired subsequent to the expiry of the Scheme mentioned in the Circular CO:GM:CIR:2/93-94 dated 20.5.1993;
and
who were extended the additional benefits in addition to the normal retirement benefits.

50. ERO-2003 was preceded with certain Resolutions bringing Amendment Pension Regulations.  Resolutions relating to ICICI Bank Employees Pension Scheme on 30.06.2003 runs as follows:-
"Resolved that necessary amendment be carried out in the regulations governing the payment of pension to the members, particularly to amend the definition of VRS as mentioned in regulation 2 (z) (e) so as to mean and include the Early Retirement Option 2003 scheme of the Bank and to execute the deed of variation in this regard and submit the same to the Office of Commissioner of Income Tax for approval".
Resolved further that regulation 35 governing the pension payment to the employees who opt for VRS be amended so that the employees who opt for retirement under the Early Retirement Option 2003 scheme of the Bank are provided with the benefit of monthly pension payments immediately from the succeeding month."  (emphasis added)

51. Regulation 2 (zea) was added by way of amendment after Regulation 2 (ze) with effect from 01.07.2003.  Contention of the Bank is that Pension benefits are applicable only to those employees who exercised their option for Pension in 1995 and those who have retired on VRS during 1993-1994 and Regulation 2 (zea) and 35 (ii) would not be applicable to ERO-2003.  Hollowness of the above submission is evident on careful analysis of ERO-2003 scheme vis-a-vis Pension Regulations.

52. Regulation 2 (ze) reads as follows:-
'VRS' means Bank of Madura Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme enclosed to the circular CO.STF:39/94-95 dated July 21, 1994, or any other specific scheme that may be implemented in future bringing such scheme under the definition of this regulation. The employees who have completed 20 years of service in the bank and who have retired subsequent to the expiry of the scheme mentioned in the Circular CO:GM:CIR:2/93-94 dated May 20, 1993, and who were extended the additional benefits in addition to the normal retirement benefits shall be deemed and considered to have retired under VRS.

53. The above resolution and regulation 2 (zea) make it clear that regulation was amended so that the employee who opt for retirement under ERO-2003 scheme are provided with the benefit of monthly pension payment.  Explanation of monthly pension payment to ERO-2003 optees  only be the meaningful interpretation of the above resolution.

54. As per Regulation 2 (m) of BME Pension Regulations,  permanent employee alone is eligible for the Scheme and not a temporary employee.  Permanent employee must have completed 20 years of service and must have opted for the Scheme.

55. Regulation 35 relates to Pension to Employees retiring under VRS.  Regulation 35 (i) & (ii) reads as under :-
"35. Pension to Employees retiring under VRS (i) An employee who has opted for pension and who retired under VRS enumerated in Regulation 2 (ze) of these regulations and who has completed twenty years of service in the bank shall be eligible for pension from the date of his attaining the age of superannuation i.e., the date on which he would have retired had he continued in the employment if he is otherwise eligible under these regulations.
(ii) The eligible employees who have already retired under VRS may exercise their irrevocable option in writing in the format prescribed by the Bank within sixty days from the date of notice to be sent to them.  Such employees have to refund the bank's entire contribution to the Provident Fund including interest received with further simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date of withdrawal of the Provident Fund amount till the date of refund.  The refund of the amount shall be made to the bank within thirty days from the date of superannuation to enable the employee to get the benefits under pension scheme.  Otherwise it will be deemed that the member has opted out of the pension scheme.

56. Sub clause No. (v) was added in regulation 35 by way of amendment effective from 1.7.2003 which reads as under:-
"(v) An employee who has opted for pension under this Regulations and who opts for retirement under ICICI Bank Early Retirement Option-2003 as enumerated in regulation 2 (zea) of this Regulations, and who has completed 20 years of services in the Bank shall be eligible for pension from the date of retirement thereunder and the payment of pension to him shall commence from the succeeding month."

57. Much emphasis was laid upon regulation 35 (v) to contend that ERO-2003 optees to become eligible for pension :- (i) must have earlier opted for pension in 1995; (ii) employee must have completed 20 years of service to be eligible for pension.  Laying emphasis upon the newly added regulation 35 (v), on behalf of the Respondent Bank, it was mainly contended that Petitioners have not earlier opted for pension and therefore, Petitioners are not eligible for pension.

58. Writ Petitioners (excepting two Writ Petitions W.P.No.11180/2004 and W.P.No.36764/2003) numbering about 723 are the ERO-2003 optees.  According to the Bank, ERO-2003 scheme is entirely  different and that Writ Petitioners were paid the benefits under ERO-2003 scheme and Petitioners are not eligible to claim Pension under Pension Regulations.  Early Retirement Option-2003 came into effect w.e.f. 01.07.2003.

59. Clause-4 deals with eligibility under ERO-2003 scheme which reads as under:-
4. Eligibility : All permanent employees of the Bank who have completed at least 7 years of service and are 40 years of age as on July 31, 2003 will be considered eligible to opt for the benefits under the scheme.  For the purpose of this clause, the services rendered by the permanent employees in the organisations merged with the Bank will be considered as eligible service in terms of respective schemes of amalgamation.

60. Clause-7 deals early retirement benefits which reads as under:-
Early Retirement Benefit : Eligible Employees would, subject to the terms and conditions of the scheme, be eligible to receive the benefits as set out in clauses 8A/8B, 8C and 8D hereof as may be applicable.

61. Clause 8A deals with one time cash benefit which reads as under:-
One time Cash Benefit : An Eligible Employee shall be entitled to the following benefit, subject to applicable tax deduction at source:
(i) 3 months' salary for every completed year of service or
(ii) Salary for the Remaining Months of Service; whichever is less.

62. Clause 8B deals with Annuity Benefit which is as under:-
Annuity Benefit : Subject to applicable tax deduction at source, if the Eligible Employees so desire, provided there are adequate number of such Eligible Employees, the Bank may consider buying an annuity for the benefit of Eligible Employees out of the total benefit amount mentioned in Clause 8A payable to Eligible Employees, less applicable tax, if any.  The annuity benefit will be payable monthly for a certain specified period.

63. Clause 8C deals with other benefits which is relevant.  Clause 8C reads as under:-
8C. Other Benefits : An Eligible Employee shall also be entitled to the following benefits, subject to applicable tax deduction at source:
(i) Group Medical insurance cover of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four lakh) per annum, will be extended to each Eligible Employee upto his normal date of retirement.
The insurance cover will be available for the Eligible Employee, his spouse and dependant children upto the age of 24 years but shall not exceed a number of four including the eligible employee; total insurance cover being not over Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four lakh) per annum.
(ii) Encashment of balance privilege leave (as per leave rules) and unclaimed Leave Travel Allowance, if any, standing to the credit of the Eligible Employee on the Retirement Date.
(iii) Amounts payable on Retirement Date under the Bank's Provident, Gratuity, Superannuation Funds, and Pension/Family Pension Scheme, if any, as per the Rules of the respective Funds/Schemes of the Bank or Statutory Provident Fund Authority as the case may be.

64. Clause 8D deals with Pension Benefit which is as under:-
Pension Benefit : The Eligible Employees who have opted for pension benefit as per the erstwhile Bank of Madura Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995, will be eligible for the same as per the terms and conditions of the said Regulations.

65. On the basis of Clause 35 (ii) BME Pension Regulations and Clause 8D of ERO-2003, it was mainly argued that only those who have exercised their option for Pension benefits as per Pension Regulations, 1995 alone are eligible to Pension benefits.  Plea of the Bank is not in consonance with resolutions passed prior to introduction ERO-2003 and of  Clause 8C (iii) of ERO-2003.  As per Clause 8C (iii) an eligible employee shall also be entitled to the benefits which are payable on retirement date as under:-
Clause 8C (iii) Amounts payable on Retirement Date under the Bank's Provident, Gratuity, Superannuation Funds, and Pension/Family Pension Scheme, if any, as per the Rules of the respective Funds/Schemes of the Bank or Statutory Provident Fund Authority as the case may be.

66. As per BME Pension Regulations, 1995, permanent employees of the Bank who have completed 20 years of service are entitled to be paid pension under the Scheme.

67. ERO-2003 covers wide range of employees.  As per Clause 4 of ERO-2003, all the employees of the Bank who have completed at least 7 years of service and or 40 years of age as on 31.07.2003 are eligible to opt for the benefits under the ERO-2003 scheme.   In other words, even those who have completed 7 years of service are eligible to opt for retirement under ERO-2003 scheme.  In case of Writ Petitioners, all of them have completed 20 years of service who are eligible for Pension under BME Pension Regulations, 1995.  When the Writ Petitioners are entitled to pension under the existing scheme, as per Clause 8C (iii) of ERO-2003, they are eligible to receive Pension/family Pension. It is only for that purpose Regulation 2 (zea) was added by way of amendment to Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995.  At the risk of repetition, we may again refer to Regulation 2 (zea) which reads as under:-
"2 (zea) : Voluntary Retirement Scheme means and to be understood as ICICI Bank Early Retirement Option 2003 scheme and this amendment in benefits will cover only those employees who avail of such early retirement option under ICICI Bank Early Retirement Option, 2003 scheme. (effective from 01.7.2003)

68. Regulation 2 (zea) read with ERO 8 (c) (iii)  makes it abundantly clear that employee who opts for retirement under ICICI Bank ERO-2003 and who has completed 20 years of service in the Bank shall be eligible for Pension from the date of retirement.  Writ Petitioners (excepting 7 Writ Petitioners in W.P.No.11180/2004 viz., Nirmal Kumar, R.Valliappan, K.R.Srimathee, S.Kaliyapural, Raja Elayakumar, M.Umayal and K.Paramasivam) have completed 20 years of service and opted for ERO-2003.   Clause 8C (iii) of ERO-2003 read with amended Regulation 2 (zea) of BME Pension Regulations would make it clear that those who have completed 20 years of service and opted under ERO are to be construed as retiring under VRS.   All the Writ Petitioners (excepting 7 Writ Petitioners in W.P.No.11180/2004 viz., Nirmal Kumar, R.Valliappan, K.R.Srimathee, S.Kaliyapural, Raja Elayakumar, M.Umayal and K.Paramasivam) who have completed 20 years of service are eligible to get Pension.

69. Regulation 35 (ii) reads as under:-
"The eligible employees who have already retired under VRS may exercise their irrevocable option in writing in the format prescribed y the Bank within sixty days from the date of notice to be sent to them.  Such employees have to refund the bank's entire contribution to the Provident Fund including interest received with further simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date of withdrawal of the Provident Fund amount till the date of refund.  The refund of the amount shall be made to the bank within thirty days from the date of superannuation to enable the employee to get the benefits under pension scheme.  Otherwise it will be deemed that the member has opted out of the pension scheme."

70. Writ Petitioners though, they have not opted for Pension in 1995, having opted for ERO-2003 and having completed 20 years of service are eligible to receive Pensionary benefits as per Regulation 35,  A combined reading of Regulation 2 (ze) read with Clause 8C (iii), all the Writ Petitioners (excepting 7 Writ Petitioners in W.P.No.11180/2004 viz., Nirmal Kumar, R.Valliappan, K.R.Srimathee, S.Kaliyapural, Raja Elayakumar, M.Umayal and K.Paramasivam) are eligible to receive Pension.  In the counter, it is averred that Pension Regulation was introduced during the year 1995 and all the employees are governed by Regulations.  While so, no distinction could be made between who have ERO optees  by saying that they would not be covered under BME Pension Regulations, 1995.

71. W.P.No.11180/2003 :-
Out of 40 Writ Petitioners, 33 are Provident Fund optees claiming Pension who have completed 20 years of service.  Seven Pension optees with less than 20 years of service.  Though, 33 Writ Petitioners are Provident Fund optees as they have completed 20 years of service, as per Regulation 2 (zea) read with 35 (ii), those 33 Writ Petitioners are entitled for Pension.


72. Remaining seven Writ Petitioners are: (1) Nirmal Kumar, (2) R.Valliappan, (3) K.R.Srimathee, (4) S.Kaliyapural, (5) Raja Elayakumar, (6) M.Umayal and (7) K.Paramasivam. Employees seeking VRS to be eligible for pension a minimum 20 years of service  required as per Regulation 35(ii).  The above said seven Writ Petitioners have not completed 20 years of service have referred Regulation 14 of Pension Regulations which makes eligible for pension on completion of 10 years "subject to other conditions contained in the Regulations".  According to the learned counsel for the Respondents subject to other conditions which are covered under Chapter V i.e. Classes of Pension like (i) invalid pension (Regulation 30), and (ii) pre-mature retirement pension (Regulation 32).

73. Laying emphasis upon Clause 29(5) Chapter V, Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that the qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this regulation shall be increased by a period of not exceeding five years and if that five years added to those seven Writ Petitioners, they would also be entitled to get Pension under BME Pension Regulations,1995.


74. Clause 29 (5) reads as under:-
"29(5) : The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty three years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation."

75. It was contended that period of 5 years should be added to those seven Writ Petitioners and that they are deemed to have completed 20 years of service.  Clause 29 (5) would be applicable only to those of the employee retiring voluntarily who is otherwise eligible to apply for VRS.  To apply for VRS, 20 years of qualifying service is a pre-requisite.  Only when an employee satisfies the essential pre-requisite to go on VRS, Clause 29 (5) can be availed. When seven of the Writ Petitioners lacks the essential pre-requisite of 20 years of qualifying service to go on VRS, they cannot seek to avail the  benefit of Clause 29 (5).  The contention that by applying Clause 29 (5), five years of qualifying service is to be added to those Writ Petitioners who do not possess the essential pre-requisite defies logic.  Since,  7 Writ Petitioners have not completed 20 years of service are not eligible to get Pension under BME Pension Regulations, 1995.

76. W.P.No.36764/2003:-
Petitioner was an employee of Bank of Madura and retired from service on 08.09.1993.  As per Pension Regulations of Bank of Madura, Petitioner  having opted for Pension is entitled to receive Pension.  Petitioner made an application for payment of Pension on 07.02.1995.   But his application was rejected by the Bank giving reason as not retired ordinarily.

77. Mr. A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents was fair in submitting that Writ Petitioner Raghavendra in W.P.No.36764/2003 would be eligible to get Pension as he has opted for Pension even in 1995.  Hence, Petitioner in W.P.No.36764/2003 is eligible to get Pension.

78. W.P.Nos.32502, 36782, 37150, 37197, 37739/2003, 1421 and 8809/2004:-
In the result, all the seven Writ Petitions are allowed with the following directions and observations:-
It is held that all the Writ Petitioners are eligible to Pension under Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995.
Arrears of Pension is payable to the Writ Petitioners and also the future Pension as admissible under the Regulations.
As contemplated under Regulation 35 (ii), all the Writ Petitioners are to refund to the Bank entire contribution to the Provident Fund including interest received with further simple interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of payment of P.F. amount till the date of refund.
The P.F. amount to be refunded along with interest to be repaid to the Bank by the Writ Petitioners shall be adjusted from out of the arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioners.
After adjustment of arrears of pension, if PF amount becomes payable by the Petitioners, Petitioners shall pay the same along with accrued interest within 60 days from the date of receipt of copy of this Order.
After adjusting the PF amount along with accrued interest, if any balance arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioners shall be paid within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Monthly pension payable to the Petitioners shall be paid commencing from January 2009 which is payable in the first week of February 2009.

79. W.P.No.11180/2004:-
In the result,
It is held that Petitioners 8,14,20,22,25,29,30 [ Nirmal Kumar, R.Valliappan, K.R.Srimathee, S.Kaliyapural, Raja Elayakumar, M.Umayal and K.Paramasivam] are not entitled to Pension under Regulation 35 (ii) and the Writ Petition is dismissed as against those seven Writ Petitioners.
Insofar as other 33 Writ Petitioners, they are eligible to Pension.
Arrears of Pension is payable to the Writ Petitioners and also the future Pension as admissible under the Regulations.
As contemplated under Regulation 35 (ii), all the Writ Petitioners are to refund to the Bank entire contribution to the Provident Fund including interest received with further simple interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of payment of P.F. amount till the date of refund.
The P.F. amount to be refunded along with interest to be repaid to the Bank by the Writ Petitioners shall be adjusted from out of the arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioners.
After adjustment of arrears of pension, if PF amount becomes payable by the Petitioners, Petitioners shall pay the same along with accrued interest within 60 days from the date of receipt of copy of this Order.
After adjusting the PF amount along with accrued interest, if any balance arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioners shall be paid within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Monthly pension payable to the Petitioners shall be paid commencing from January 2009 which is payable in the first week of February 2009.

80. W.P.No.36764/2003:-
In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed with the following directions and observations:-
It is held that the Writ Petitioner is eligible to Pension under Bank of Madura Employees Pension Regulations, 1995.
Arrears of Pension is payable to the Writ Petitioner and also the future Pension as admissible under the Regulations.
As contemplated under Regulation 35 (ii), the Writ Petitioner is to refund to the Bank entire contribution to the Provident Fund including interest received with further simple interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of payment of P.F. amount till the date of refund.
The P.F. amount to be refunded along with interest to be repaid to the Bank by the Writ Petitioner shall be adjusted from out of the arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioner.
After adjusting the PF amount along with accrued interest if any balance arrears of Pension payable to the Writ Petitioner shall be paid within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Monthly pension payable to the Petitioners shall be paid commencing from January 2009 which is payable in the first week of February 2009.





bbr

To

The Additional Secretary,
Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs,
(Banking and Insurance),
No.235, Jeevandeep Buildings,
Sansad Marg-1,
New Delhi 110 001



Secretary of Podhu Dikshidar challenges the final order passed by the Government dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the Petitioner under Sec.114 of HR & CE Act. The impugned order of the Government confirms the order of the Commissioner, HR & CE dated 31.7.1987 appointing Executive Officer for Sri Sabanayagar Temple, Chidambaram under Sec.45 (1) of HR & CE Act.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:02 .02.2009

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI

W.P.No. 18248 of 2006
and
M.P.Nos.2/2006 and 1/2008


W.P.No. 18248 of 2006:

Sri Sabanayagar Temple,
Chidambaram
rep. by its Secretary of
Podhu Dikshidar,
Chidambaram. ... Petitioner

Vs.

1. The State of Tamil Nadu
    rep. by Secretary,
    Department of Tamil Development,
    Religious Endowments & Information
    Department,
    Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

2. The Commissioner,
    Hindu Religious Endowments,
    Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai-34.

3. M.P.Sathiyavel Murugan,
    Founder/Director,
    Tamil Vazhipattu Payirchi Maiyam,
    Adambakkam, Chennai-88.

4. U.Arumugasamy. ... Respondents


[3rd Respondent and 4th Respondent
are ordered to be impleaded as
Respondents in the Writ Petition
as per the Orders in M.P.No.2/2006
and M.P.No.1/2008 dt. 02.02.2009.


M.P.No.2/2006 :

M.P.Sathiyavel Murugan,
Founder/Director,
Tamil Vazhipattu Payirchi Maiyam,
Adambakkam, Chennai-88. ... Petitioner/
Proposed Respondent.

Vs.

1. Sri Sabanayagar Temple,
    Chidambaram,
    rep. by its Secretary to
    Podhu Dikshidars, Chidambaram.

2. The State of Tamil Nadu
    rep. by Secretary,
    Department of Tamil Development,
    Religious Endowments & Information
    Department,
    Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

3. The Commissioner,
    Hindu Religious Endowments,
    Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai-34. ... Respondents


M.P.No.1/2008 :

U.Arumugasamy. ... Petitioner/
Proposed Respondent.

Vs.


1. Sri Sabanayagar Temple,
    Chidambaram,
    rep. by its Secretary to
    Podhu Dikshidars, Chidambaram.

2. The State of Tamil Nadu
    rep. by Secretary,
    Department of Tamil Development,
    Religious Endowments & Information
    Department,
    Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

3. The Commissioner,
    Hindu Religious Endowments,
    Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai-34. ... Respondents

W.P.No.18248/2006 : Writ Petition filed under Art.  226 of the Constitution of India to issue Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the 1st Respondent made in G.O.Ms. (D) No.168 dated 09.5.2006 and quash the same.

M.P.No.2/2006 and M.P.No.1/2008 : Petitions are filed to implead the Petitioners as Respondent in W.P.No.18248/2006.

For Petitioner in Mr. B.Kumar
W.P.No.18248/2006 : Senior Counsel
and 1st Respondent in for
M.P.2/2006 & 1/2008     Mr.K.Chandrasekaran

For Petitioner in Mr.R.Gandhi.
M.P.No.2/2006 : Senior Counsel for
and M.P.1/2008 for
Ms.Hemalatha
and
Mr.R.Sagadevan


For Respondents : Mr. R.Ramasamy
in W.P.No.18248/2006 Addl. Advocate General
and 2nd and 3rd for
Respondents in Mr.R.T.Chandrasekaran, M.P.2/06 & 1/08. Spl.GP [HR & CE]


----


COMMON ORDER

Writ Petitioner  Secretary of Podhu Dikshidar challenges the final order passed by the Government dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the Petitioner under Sec.114 of HR & CE Act.  The impugned order of the Government confirms the order of the Commissioner, HR & CE dated 31.7.1987 appointing Executive Officer for Sri Sabanayagar Temple, Chidambaram under Sec.45 (1) of HR & CE Act.

2. Administration of Sri Sabanayagar Temple, Chidambaram has been the subject matter of litigation for about a century.  Dispute relating to administration of temple has had chequered career. For the understanding of contentious points raised, it is necessary to briefly refer to the earlier litigations and the background.



3. Scheme of Administration & O.S.No.16/1933
   -------------------------------------------------            }
   (1939) II MLJ 11

(i) Arulmigu Sabanayagar Temple (Natarajar) at Chidambaram, Cuddalore District is a Public Hindu Religious Institution, within the meaning of Sec.6 (18) read with Sec.6 (20) of HR & CE Act and all the provisions of the said Act are applicable to the above said temple.  The erstwhile Hindu Religious Endowment Board settled a "Scheme of Administration" in Board's Order No.997 dated 08.5.1933 under Tamil Nadu Act II of 1927.

(ii) Some of the Podhu Dikshidars have filed suit in O.S.No.16/1933 on the file of District Court, South Arcot to set aside the Board's Order on the ground that temple is an absolute private property of Podhu Dikshidars and out side the scope of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1927.

(iii) District Court, Cuddalore rejected the Dikshidar's claim of the temple being private and passed a decree modifying the scheme settled by HR & CE Board in O.A.No.73/1932.  On appeal filed by Dikshidars in A.S.No.306/1936, High Court confirmed the scheme with some modifications which has been reported in (1939) II MLJ 11.
(iv) G.O.Ms.No.894, Rural Welfare Dept. dated 28.8.1951
      ----------------------------------------------------------       }
      G.O.Ms.No.1278, Revenue Dept. dated 21.5.1954
Though the temple had been declared as a public temple, provisions of the Act could not be enforced.  Hence, in order to enforce the provisions of the Act, temple was notified under Chapter VI (A) u/s.65 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.894, Rural Welfare Dept. dated 28.8.1951.  The said Government Order was challenged in W.P.Nos.379 and 380/1951 by Dikshidars and the notification was quashed by the Judgment dated 13.12.1951.  Challenging the Order in W.P. Nos. 379 and 380/1951, Government have filed C.A.No.39/1953 before the Supreme Court.  Meanwhile, by G.O.Ms.No.1278, Revenue Dept. dated 21.5.1954, State Government cancelled the above notification and the Civil Appeal was therefore withdrawn.

(v) W.P.No.5638/1982:-
Stating that Podhu Dikshidars have failed to carryout the lawful orders issued by the Department and the Management of the temple was unsatisfactory, notice in Rc.No.52754/1982/B6 dated 20.7.1982 was issued to the Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars pointing out several irregularities in the administration of the temple and its properties and the proposal to appoint an Executive Officer.  That order was challenged by the Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars in W.P.No.5638/1982 before the High Court, Madras.  By the Judgment dated 09.8.1983, High Court directed that the aforesaid notice would be treated only as show cause notice and not as a decision and that it was open to the Dikshidars to putforth their objections that were available to them including the vires of Sec.45 of HR & CE Act.

(vi) Pursuant to the direction of the Court, Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars have filed reply on 09.01.1984.  Thereafter, enquiry was conducted by the Commissioner.  Main contention of  Dikshidars was that appointment of Executive Officer would be interfering with their rights guaranteed under Art. 26 of Constitution of India.  Commissioner has passed an order on 31.7.1987 observing that appointment of Executive Officer is only to look after the administration of the temple and the management of the properties.  Commissioner observed that appointment of Executive Officer will not mean interference with the  rights of Dikshidars relating to religious practices in the temple.



(vii) W.P.Nos.7843/1987 & W.A.No.145/1997:-
As against the order of appointment of Executive Officer, again Podhu Dikshidars have filed W.P.No.7843/1987 before the High Court.  Executive Officer has assumed charge of the temple on 10.8.1987.  High Court has not stayed the appointment of Executive Officer, but stayed only Rule 3  i.e. powers and duties of the Executive Officer.  W.P.No.7843/1987 was dismissed on 11.2.1997 which was challenged by Podhu Dikshidars in W.A.No.145/1997.  In the Writ Appeal, Court has directed Podhu Dikshidars to file a Revision u/s.114 of HR & CE Act before the Respondents.  Further, the Court has ordered stay of Clause-III to continue till the disposal of the Revision.

(viii) Consequently, Podhu Dikshidars have filed Revision Petition before the Government under Sec.114 of the Act.  Revision was rejected by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.168 TDC & RE Dept. dated 09.5.2006 which is now challenged in this Writ Petition.

4. Opposing the Writ Petition, Respondents have filed counter stating that the appointment of Executive Officer was only to streamline the administration of the temple and not to displace the Podhu Dikshidars from the temple.  Stand of the Government is that Petitioner has failed to perform the lawful duties enjoined on them u/s.28 of the Act.  It is averred that Podhu Dikshidars have not maintained the accounts and that the offerings to the temple by worshipers have not been accounted for by them and that for effective supervision, better management and administration, appointment of Executive Officer is very much essential.

5. Onbehalf of the Writ Petitioner, Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel has made an elaborate submissions inter alia contending that the direction of the Court in W.P.No.5638/1982 to issue fresh show cause notice was not kept in view.  Learned Senior Counsel inter alia made the following submissions:-

Once the Court directed the Government to consider the matter on merits, the Authority should have elaborately enquired into merits of the matter.  Neither the Commissioner nor the Government had gone into question of mismanagement.
Before appointment of Executive Officer, Sec.45 does require issuance of show cause notice.  Unless there is enquiry and finding, the administration of the temple by Podhu Dikshidars cannot be interfered with.
As per the decision in 1952 I MLJ 557, the temple is a denominational temple and the Writ Petitioner derived its right from its constitution and Petitioner is entitled to the protection under Art.26 of Constitution of India.
In view of Sec.107 of HR & CE Act, provisions of the Act are not to affect the rights of the religious denomination.
Appointment of Executive Officer is an interference with the religious affairs and the same is violative of Art.226 of Constitution of India.

6. Contending that right to administer the property does not mean maladministration of the property, Mr. R.Ramasamy, learned Addl. Advocate General inter alia made the following submissions:-
Sri Sabanayagar temple is a public temple.
Podhu Dikshidars do not have separate faith or religious tenets other than that of Hindu faith and therefore, Podhu Dikshidars are not 'religious denomination'.
Expression used by the Commissioner 'for better and efficient management' cannot be construed  that the Commissioner has shifted the basis.
There had been number of omissions and commissions to mismanagement and mismanagement continues.  Executive Officer was appointed to set right the mismanagement, better and efficient management of the temple.
In 1952 (1) MLJ 557 nowhere it was held that Chidambaram temple is a 'denominational temple.
After appointment of Executive Officer, his powers and duties are demarcated and Podhu Dikshidars are not completely obliterated from the administration of the temple.
7. Impleading Petitioner Arumugasamy is 79 years old Sanyasi and claim to be a devotee of Lord Shiva, a Sivanadiar living at Kumudimoolai village, Bhuvanagiri Taluk, Chidambaram.  I have also heard at length Mr. R.Gandhi, the learned Senior Counsel for the Impleading Petitioner.
(i) Grievance of the said impleading Petitioner is that he was not permitted to sing Devaram at Chidambaram Natarajar temple and that impleading Petitioner was beaten and chased away by Dikshidars.  In this regard, on 04.07.2000, criminal case was registered by the Chidambaram Town Police in Cr.No.318/2000.  In Crl.M.P.No.851/2001, the Addl. District Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore passed an order on 05.10.2001 dismissing the complaint.  Challenging that order, Petitioner filed Crl. R.C.No.528/2002 which was dismissed by the High Court.  Challenging that order, Petitioner has filed SLP No.909/2004 and the same is said to have been admitted by the Supreme Court.

(ii) Grievance of the said Impleading Petitioner is that he was not permitted to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambala Medai of Chidambaram temple.  Earlier, Petitioner has filed W.P.No.2261/2004 wherein the Court has permitted the Petitioner to go inside the temple and recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam.  Jt. Commissioner of HR & CE, Mayavaram rejected the Petitioner's request (12.12.2004).  Petitioner filed Revision before the Commissioner, HR & CE in R.P.No.67/2007 wherein the Commissioner set aside the order of Jt. Commissioner and permitted the impleading Petitioner Arumugasamy to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambala Medai in the Natarajar temple.  The order of the Commissioner was challenged by Podhu Dikshidars by filing W.P.No.18424/2007 wherein the impleading Petitioner is arrayed as 3rd Respondent. Writ Petition filed by Podhu Dikshidars [W.P.No.18424/2007] was dismissed on 22.5.2007.  Against which Writ Appeal [W.A.No.776/2007] was preferred which was also dismissed on 06.12.2007.

(iii) From the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the impleading Petitioner, it comes to be known that impleading Petitioner Arumugasamy is a Sivanadiar and is a interested person in the proper administration of the temple.  Stating that impleading Petitioner is unable to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam in the temple in a fear and that he apprehends danger from Dikshidars, Petitioner had filed impleading Petition in M.P.No.1/2008 seeking to implead himself in the present Writ Petition.

(iv) According to the impleading Petitioner, he came to know about the Writ Petition filed by Podhu Dikshidars after the Executive Officer had taken charge and management of the temple.  Petitioner averred that since Stay was granted, Executive Officer is unable to perform any acts and Petitioner had filed the impleading Petition.
(v) Drawing Court's attention to various dates and events, learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner submitted that the impleading Petitioner was assaulted by Dikshidars inside the temple on various occasions and that Petitioner is a necessary party to be impleaded so as to protect the ancient temple.  Learned Senior Counsel also drawn Court's attention to number of criminal cases filed against Dikshidars either at the instance of the Petitioner or at the instance of other devotees.

(vi) Mr. R.Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner placed reliance upon G.O.Ms.No.53 Tamil Development Religious Charitable Endowments and Information Dept. dated 29.2.2008 wherein Government has passed an order permitting any devotee can become a Archaga, irrespective of caste and colour.  On the basis of the said G.O., impleading Petitioner made an attempt to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambala Medai and that Podhu Dikshidars had filed suit in O.S.No.176/2006 against the impleading Petitioner.

(vii) Learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner would submit that to implement the said G.O. and to sing Devaram and Thiruvasagam and also for peaceful worship, appointment of Executive Officer was justified.  Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that impleading Petitioner is necessary party as he is interested in fighting the worshipping right.

(viii) In M.P.No.2/2006, Impleading Petitioner Sathiyavel Murugan is the Founder/Director of Tamil Vazhipattu Payirchi Maiyam functioning at No.12/F1, 11th street, New Colony, Adambakkam, Chennai-88.

(ix) According to the Impleading Petitioner Sathiyavel Murugan he is interested in promoting Tamil Mantrams as per Agamas in various places including Foreign countries with religious affairs and Impleading Petitioner is interested in the subject matter and as such he has to be impleaded as Respondent in the Writ Petition.

(x) Onbehalf of Podhu Dikshidars, Mr. B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel submitted that if at all the impleading Petitioner Arumugasamy had any grievance, he has to approach the HR & CE Board and as such Petitioner cannot be impleaded as Respondent in the Writ Petition.  Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the impleading Petitioner has been instigated to cause disturbance to the worship in the temple and that he is not a necessary party to the Writ Petition.

8. Having regard to the submissions, the following points arose for consideration:-
1) Whether Chidambaram Sabanayagar temple is a denominational temple?
2) Whether Podhu Dikshidars are right in contending that the temple is the denominational temple and that there can be no interference with the administration of its property?
3) Whether Petitioner is right in contending that the alleged mismanagement was in as early as in 1980 and there has been no fresh material to show that the mismanagement continues?
4) When the original show cause notice was based on one set of alleged mismanagement, can Commissioner/Government change the basis of mismanagement?
5) Whether the impugned order is vitiated due to alleged paradigm shift in the enquiry as contended by the Petitioner.

6) Whether the appointment of Executive Officer is an interference with the religious affairs and whether the same is violative of Art.26 of Constitution of India.

9. About the temple :-
Sri Sabanayagar Temple, Chidambaram is a public temple of Hindu Religious Institution within the meaning of Sec.6 (18) read with Sec.6 (20) of Tamil Nadu HR & CE Act.  Chidambaram Temple is a famous Hindu temple dedicated to Lord Shiva located in the heart of the temple town of Chidambaram.  Chidambaram Temple dedicated to Lord Shiva (Siva) in His form of the Cosmic Dancer, Nataraja ( eluhrh; ) is a temple complex spread over 40 acres in the heart of the city.  Lord Natarajar is the symbolic representation of the supreme bliss or aananda natanam.  Saivaites believe that a visit to Chidambaram leads to liberation.

10. Dikshidar, the priests of the temple are also called "Thillaivaazh Andhanar" [jpy;iythH; me;jzh;].  'Dikshidar', meaning the priests who reside in Thillai and perform poojas/religious rites.  Dikshidars are considered the foremost amongst the devotees of Lord Shiva.

11. Settlement / Scheme of Administration:-
The erstwhile Hindu Religious Endowment Board settled a "Scheme of Administration" in Board's Order No.997 dated 08.5.1933 under the Tamil Nadu Act II of 1927.  The salient features of the above Scheme as per Board's Order are:-
(i) All the properties, movable and immovable, which have been dedicated and which will be dedicated to the deity, shall vest with the deity (Clause 3).
(ii) The active management should vest in the Committee, consists of 9 members who were to be elected from among the Podhu Dikshidars (Clause 4).
(iii) To manage the affairs of the temple and to assist the Committee, the Board shall appoint a Manager, on payment of salary (Clause 5).
(iv) The Managing Committee should establish hundials for the deposit of voluntary and compulsory offerings and also to fix a rate for the performance of Archana etc. (Clause 8 (a) and (b).
(v) The Manager shall maintain the accounts of the temple and registers as per the directions of the superiors (Clause 8 (a) and (b).
(vi) He [Manager] shall look after the Court matters.
(vii) The Manager shall exercise control over the servants, paricharakams, archakas, and office holders of the temple (Clause 8 (f).
(viii) The Managing Committee shall be responsible to put up sheds to let out (for rent) during festival occasions (Clause 10)".

12. In O.S.No.16/1933:-
Claiming that the temple is an absolute private property of Podhu Dikshdars and outside the scope of HR & CE Act.  Podhu Dikshidars have filed suit in O.S.No.16/1933.  District Court, Cuddalore rejected Podhu Dikshidars claim that the temple being private property and passed the decree modifying the scheme settled by HR & CE Board in O.A.No.73/1932.  On appeal filed by the Podhu Dikshidars in High Court in A.S.No.306/1936, High Court confirmed the scheme with some modifications.  The judgment of the High Court has been reported in 1939 II MLJ 11 [Ponnuman Dikshitar and another v. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras and others].

13. In the said decision, High Court has recorded a finding that it cannot be doubted that the suit temple is a public institution within the meaning of the Act and not a private temple as contended by Podhu Dikshidars.  The observations of the High Court in the said decision read as follows:-
" ..... So far as the question of jurisdiction based on the non-applicability of the Act is concerned, the learned counsel, we think, wisely refrained from pressing it because it cannot be seriously doubted that the suit temple is a public institution within the meaning of the Act and not a private temple as contended for.  We agree that some of the grounds on which the learned District Judge purported to hold against the plaintiffs may not be valid, but having regard to the character of the temple it seems to us that it would be too much to contend that this is a private temple.  So early as 1885 when the question was raised in a suit by the Dikshitars, Muthuswami Aiyar and Shephard, JJ., in their judgment dated 17th March, 1890, in A.S.Nos.108 and 159 of 1888 observed that it was not denied that the institution was being used as a place of public worship from time immemorial and that there was no particle of evidence in support of the assertion that this ancient temple of Sri Nataraja was the private property of the Dikshitars.  Even now it is not denied that this temple is held to be very sacred by all the Saivites in this Presidency and is resorted to as a place of public worship. ......"[underlining added]

14. Whether the temple is denominational temple:-
Before we go into merits of the matter, it is necessary to consider the contention of Podhu Dikshidars that Petitioners are religious denomination within the the meaning of Article 26 of Constitution of India and therefore, the temple is protected under Article 26 of Constitution of India.  In the light of the contentions, important question arises whether Sabanayagar temple is a 'religious denominational temple' within the meaning of Article 26 of Constitution of India.
15. Onbehalf of the Petitioners,  learned Senior Counsel Mr. B.Kumar, has contended that Petitioners  Podhu Dikshidars are a 'denomination' entitled to the protection under Article 26 of Constitution of India.  Placing reliance upon AIR 1999 SC 3567 [Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram Committee and others v. Commr. HR & CE Dept. and others] and AIR 1996 SC 1334 [Pavani Sridhara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. and others] and other decisions, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court Petitioners are to be construed as 'religious denomination' enjoining a special status under Article 26 of Constitution of India and therefore, the order appointing Executive Officer is not sustainable.

16. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that right of administration to denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regulations as may be provided by law.  It was further argued that appointment of Executive Officer would take away the right of administration from the hands of Podhu Dikshidars all together and vest in other authority which would be violative of Article 26 (d) of Constitution of India.


17. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that Podhu Dikshidars being a religious denomination enjoins a special status under Article 26 of Constitution of India.  It was further argued that as religious denomination, the temple and Podhu Dikshidars are enjoined with the complete autonomy in the matter of deciding rights and ceremonies and administration of the property.  It was further argued that the impugned G.O. seeking to appoint Executive Officer deprives Podhu Dikshidars and their right to manage Sri Sabanayagar temple at Chidambaram and violative of fundamental rights under Article 26 of Constitution of India.

18. Laying emphasis upon Sec.107 of HR & CE Act, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioner submitted that the provisions of HR & CE Act is not to affect the rights of denomination or any section thereof protected under Article 26 of Constitution of India.

19. Sec.107 of T.N. Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 reads as under:-
107. Act not to affect rights under Article 26 of the Constitution :- Nothing contained in this Act shall, save as otherwise provided in section 106 and in clause (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution, be deemed to confer any power or impose any duty in contravention of the rights conferred on any religious denomination or any section thereof by Article 26 of the Constitution.

20. In support of the contention that Podhu Dikshidars are denomination and are entitled to protection under Article 26 of Constitution of India, reliance was mainly placed upon 1952 (I) MLJ 557 [Sri Lakshmindra Theertha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras].  In the said case, Dikshidars contended that the temple income is their only source of livelihood and that they are 'religious denomination'.  In the said decision, Podhu Dikshidars' contention was that appointment of Executive Officer would amount to interference with the religious affairs and the same is violative of Art.26 of Constitution of India.  In 1952 (1) MLJ 557,   Division Bench held that Podhu Dikshidars are 'religious denomination'.   On behalf of the Petitioners, it was contended that Division Bench of this Court has held that Petitioners are entitled to protection under Article 26 of Constitution of India and the finding that Petitioners are a 'denomination'  rendered by the Division Bench was under the Constitution of India.   It was mainly argued that the above decision was not based on any interpretation of HR & CE Act, but based on the interpretation of Constitution of what 'denomination' means.   In Sri Shirur Mutt case [1952 (1) MLJ 557], Division Bench had observed that both Sri Shirur Mutt and Podhu Dikshidars of Sri Sabanayagar temple are 'denomination' and are entitled to protection under Article 26 of Constitution of India.

21. It was further argued that since Government has not challenged the findings in the judgment in  1952 (1) MLJ 557. Podhu Dikshidars are 'religious denomination', the decision in  1952 (1) MLJ 557 has become final as against Podhu Dikshidars and the said decision would operate as res-judicata.

22. Placing reliance upon AIR 1965 SC 1153 [Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat], the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contended that when the question was decided in Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution, any subsequent suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter, it would operate as res-judicata because principles of res-judicata is based on  public policy.


23. Contending that Podhu Dikshidars are 'religious denomination' much emphasis was laid upon the decision is 1952 (1) MLJ 557 [Sri Lakshmindra Theertha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras].  In the said decision, Sri Shirur Mutt and Podhu Dikshidars of Sabanayagar temple, Chidambaram challenged certain provisions of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951).  While considering the grounds of challenge, Division Bench of this Court gone into the nature and character of Dikshidars and whether the order of the Board appointing Executive Officer would affect the right of Dikshidars in the administration of temple and its properties.  Observing that services to God is the only source of livelihood and examining the nature of 'Kattalais', Division Bench held as follows:-
"The Dikshidars have no other emoluments and they combine in themselves the functions of a trustee as well as an archaka.  They have no inams and they have to devote their time exclusively to look after the affairs of the temple and carry on the worship in it by an internal arrangement made by them over a century ago as evidenced by the rules which have been framed by them and which are in vogue even at the present day.  They are prohibited from taking up any other avocation and therefore they must necessarily depend for their livelihood consisting of as many as 250 families of 1,500 members on what they receive at the temple either as Dakshina or as offerings of food known as pavadai and other offerings made to the deity.  They are bound up with the temple and service of God is the only source of their livelihood.  These in brief are the usages of the temple obtaining for several centuries. .... "

24. Considering the question whether Podhu Dikshidars are a denomination and whether right as denomination is infringed within the meaning of Art. 26 of Constitution, Division Bench proceeded to observe as follows:-
"Looking at from the point of view, whether the Podhu Dikshitars are a denomination, and whether their right as a denomination is to any extent infringed within the meaning of Article 26 it seems to us that it is a clear case, in which it can safely be said that the Podhu Dikshitars who are Smartha Brahmins, form and constitute a religious denomination or in any event, a section thereof.  They are even a closed body, because no other Smartha Brahmin who is not a Dikshitar is entitled to participate in the administration or in the worship or in the services to God.  It is their exclusive and sole privilege which has been recognised and established for over several centuries.  The notification seriously interferes with their rights to manage the affairs in matters of religion to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and even to administer such property in accordance with law.  A law which substantially deprives the religious denomination of its right to administer the property of the denomination leaving only a scintilla of the right in the denomination cannot be justified and upheld as an exercise of the power to regulate the administration of the institution.  Nor is it a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the Article 19 (5) of the Constitution."

25. The Division Bench further held that provisions of HR & CE Act to the extent that they restrict the power to exercise right to a property are not reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 (5) and must consequently held to be invalid.  Division bench further held that institution has right guaranteed under Article 25 of Constitution to practice and propagate the freely religion of which he and his followers to be adherence.

26. In the said decision, Podhu Dikshidars were equated and held to be analogous to Matathipathi, Division Bench has further held as under:-
" ..... In the case of Sri Sabhanayakar Temple at Chidambaram with which we are concerned in this petition, it should be clear from what we have stated earlier in this judgment, that the position of the Dikshitars, labelled trustees of this temple, is virtually analogous to that of a Matathipathi of a Mutt, except that the Podhu Dikshitars of this temple, functioning as trustees, will not have the same dominion over the income of the properties of the temple which the Matathipathi enjoys in relation to the income from the Mutt and its properties.  Therefore the sections which we held ultra vires in relation Mutts and Matathipathis will also be ultra vires the State Legislature in relation to Sri Sabhanayagar Temple, Chidambaram, and the Podhu Dikshitars who have the right to administer the affairs and the properties of the temple.  As we have already pointed out, even more than the case of the Srivalli Brahmins, it can be asserted that the Dikshitars of Chidambaram form a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of Constitution."

27. In the context of the provisions of HR & CE Act and in the light of the submissions, it has to be seen whether Petitioner  Podhu Dikshidars is a 'denomination' and whether Sri Sabanayagar temple, Chidambaram is a 'denominational institution'.

28. Article 26 of Constitution of India to which reference has been made reads as follows:-
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage it own affairs in matters of religion
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

29. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof has the right to administer its property in accordance with law.  The administration of its property by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.  The later is a fundamental right which no legislature can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose.

30. The language of the two clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 would at once bring out the difference between the two.  In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of the management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away.  On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law.  This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust property by means of laws validly enacted; but here again it should be remembered that under Article 26 (d), it is the religious denomination itself which has been given to the right to administer its property in accordance with law.  A law, which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which is guaranteed by Article 26 (d) of the Constitution [Vide AIR 1954 SC 282 Commissioner Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra Swaminar & (1983) 1 SCC 51 S.P.Mittal v. Union of India].

31. Referring to Oxford Dictionary the word 'denomination' and considering the scope of meaning of 'religious denomination', in  AIR 1954 SC 282 : (1954) 1 SCR 1005 [The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt], the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"As regards Art. 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression "religious denomination" and whether a Math could come within this expression.  The word "denomination" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean "a  collection of individuals classed together under the same name; a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name".  It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then.  After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at the present day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, - in many cases it is the name of the founder -  and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation.  The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by name of Shri Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teachers.  It is a fact well established by tradition that the Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher.  The High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya.  As Art.26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Maths or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come with the purview of this Article."

32. In AIR 1984 SC 51 Acharya Jagadishwaranand Avadhuta v. Police Commissioner, Calcutta], the question came up for consideration whether Ananda Marga was a 'religious denomination.  Pointing out nature of living of Ananda Marga, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Ananda Marga satisfied all the three conditions, viz., it is a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being; they have a common organisation and the collection of these individuals has a distinctive name and Ananda Marga, therefore can be appropriately treated as a religious denomination, with the Hindu religion.

33. Question whether the followers of Shri Ramakrishna are a 'religious denomination' came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in AIR 1995 SC 2089 [Bramchari Sidheswar Shai v. State of West Bengal].  The Supreme Court observed that  the  followers of Shri Ramakrishna have a common faith and that they have a common organisation and they are designated by a distinct name.  It was therefore held that the persons belonging to or owing their allegiance to Ramakrishna Mission or Ramakrishna Math belong to a religious denomination within the Hindu religion or a section thereof as would entitle them to claim the fundamental rights conferred on either of them under Article 26 of the Constitution of India.  As a necessary concomitant thereof, they have a fundamental right of establishing and maintaining institutions for a charitable purpose under Article 26 (a) of the Constitution of India, subject to course, to public order, morality and health envisaged in that very Article.

34. Observations of the Division Bench in 1952 (1) MLJ 557 that Podhu Dikshidars are a 'denomination' are to be tested in the light of well-settled principles laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court.

35. In (1962) 1 SCR 383 : AIR 1961 SC 1402 [Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali] another Constitution Bench considering the ratio laid down in Shirur Mutt case explained Sri Venkataramana Devaru case [AIR 1958 SC 255] and had laid down that the words "religious denomination" under Art.26 of Constitution must take their colour from the word religion and if this be so the expression 'religious denomination' must also specify three conditions, namely, it must be (1) a collection of religious faith, a system of belief which is conducive to the spritual well-being, i.e., a common faith; (2) common organisation; (3) a designation by a distinctive name.

36. In (1997) 4 SCC 606 [Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and others v. State of U.P. and others], the Supreme Court held that "believers of Shiva form of worship are not a denominational sect or section of Hindus, but they are Hindus as such."

37. In view of the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court, the observations of the Division Bench can hardly have any binding effect.  In fact, in W.P.No.7843/1987, learned single Judge has also taken the view that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the observations of the Division Bench in 1952 (1) MLJ 557  (supra) may not have significance.  Whatever be the observation of the Division Bench in 1952 (1) MLJ 557, the observations of the Division Bench ought to be read in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Shirur Mutt case.  Observation of the Division Bench in 1952 (1) MLJ 557 that appointment of Commissioner by notification procedure would deprive the right of Podhu Dikshidars to manage their property and vesting it Executive Officer would be a serious inroad upon the rights of Dikshidars can no longer have binding effect.

38. Referring to various decisions on 'religious denomination' in 100 Law Weekly 240 [The Asst. Commr. HR & CE, Salem and others etc., v. Nattamai K.S.Ellappa Mudaliar and others], Justice Srinivasan (as his Lordship then was) observing that Senguntha Mudaliar cannot claim to be a 'religious denomination' held as follows:-
26. The Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate its view on the interpretation of the words "religious denomination" in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuts etc., v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta and another, AIR 1984 SC 51.  The question which arose for consideration in that case was whether Ananda Marga could be accepted as a religious denomination.  While answering the question in the affirmative, the Court made a reference to the test laid down by Mukherjea, J.  In the Shirur Mutt case, AIR 1954 SC 282 referred to earlier and observed as follows:-
"This test has been folowed in the Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383 : AIR 1961 SC 1402.  In the majority judgment in S.P.Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCR 729 at p. 774 : AIR 1983 SC 1 at pp. 20-21 reference to this aspect has also been made and it has been stated:-
"The words 'religious denomination' in Art. 26 of the Constitution must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression 'Religious denomination' must also satisfy three conditions:
1. It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
2. Common organisation; and
3. Designation by a distinctive name."
...........
30. As seen from the decision of the Supreme Court, the words 'religious denomination' must take their colour from the word 'Religion'.  It is, therefore, clear that the common faith of the community should be based on religion.  It is essential that they should have common religious tenets.  The basic cord which connects them should be religion and not anything else.  If the aforesaid tests are applied in the present case, it will be seen that Senguntha Mudaliar community of Tharamangalam cannot claim to be a religious denomination.  There is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that the members of the community have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those which are common to the entire Hindu community. .... "

39. Establishment and maintenance of Sri Sabanayagar temple:-
For the purpose of invoking Art. 26 of the Constitution, Podhu Dikshidars have to prove two facts:-

1) That they established the temple.
2) They maintained the temple.

40. In AIR 1968 SC 662, the Supreme Court held that the words "Establish and Maintain" in Art. 26 (a) of Constitution must be read conjunctively and it is only those institutions which a religious denomination establishes, which it can claim to maintain and that right under Clause (a) of Art. 26 will only arise where the institution is being established by the said denomination.  Hence, as held by the Supreme Court that the burden of proof lies on  the Podhu Dikshidars to prove that the temple was established and maintained by the said Podhu Dikshidars.  There is no piece of evidence produced by Podhu Dikshidars to show that they have established the temple.

41. Special features of Chidambaram Sabanayagar temple:-
One of the special features of Chidambaram temple is the bejeweled image of Nataraja.  It depicts the Lord Shiva as the Lord of the dance Bharatanatyam.  The Lord wearing a gentle smile, steps on the demon's back, immobilizes him and performs the Ananda thaandava (the dance of eternal bliss) and discloses his true form.  The Ananda Tandava posture of Lord Shiva is one of the famous postures recognised around the world by many.  This celestial dancing posture is said to have attracted world wide devotees.  Chidambaram temple is an ancient and historic temple dedicated to Lord Shiva Nataraja and Lord Govindaraja Perumal, one of the few temples where both the Shaivite and Vaishnavite deities are enshrined in one place. Apart from 'Nataraja'  idol 'Perumal' is also in the temple and apart from  Saivites, Vaishnavites  also attend the temple for worshipping.

42. Nextly, we may consider whether Sri Sabanayagar temple, Chidambaram has been proved to have been established and maintained by Podhu Dikshidars.  By a reading of the book titled "Thillai Perunkovil Varalaru" by Vidwan K.Vellaivaranan (first published in 1987), it is seen that the temple was established by 'Chola Kingdom'.  Drawing Court's attention to certain passages in the book, learned Addl. Advocate General submitted that the temple was under the administration of 'Kings' and the same is evident from the facts and the information available in the temple.

43. The following works/renovation works are said to have been done during the reign of 'Chola Kings'.

"King Aditya Chola  I who ruled Chola Empire between 871 AD and 907 AD decorated the Vimanam of Chidambaram temple with gold plates.  This information is available in Thiruthondar Thiruvanthathi  (jpUj;bjhz;lh; jpUte;jhjp?65) written by Nambiandaar Nambi (11th Century AD)."

"The temple was under the administrative control of the Kings and it is evident from the facts that the first prakaram of the Chidambaram temple was known as Vicrama Chola Thirumaligai, second prakaram as Kulothunga Chola Thirumaligai and third prakaram as Thambiran Thiruveethi.  Western Gopuram (tower) was known as Kulothunga Chola Thirumaligai Puravayil  (Fnyhj;J';f jpUkhspif nrhHd; g[wthapy;) (South Inaidna Epicraphy No.22)."

"During the period of Kulothunga Chola  II (1133 AD to 1150 AD) several renovation works took place in Chidambaram Temple which include gold plating the vjph; mk;gsk;. cl;nfhg[uk; and jpUr;Rw;W khspif. construction of seven tier gopuram, expanding the Sivakami Ambal Sannathi, construction of temple Chariots and the construction of mandapam in the Sivaganga Tank within the temple."

44. Major repairs and renovation works are said to have been carried out only by three Kings.  Referring to Chola Kings, Pandia Kings, Pallava Kings and Vijayanagara Kings and the works done by them in the temple, there is said to have been donation of gold and jewels by various Kings and patrons to the temple.

45. Dikshidars were entitled to do pooja services in Sri Sabanayagar temple.   Over all administration of the temple was vested with Kings.  In this regard, learned Addl. Advocate General has drawn Court's attention to the following passage in the Book :-

;@Tj;jbgUkhDf;F chpikj; bjhHpy; g{z;LthGk; ,t;te;jzh;fs; jpy;iyj; jpUf;nfhapypDs;ns ,iwtd; g{ridf;Fhpa mfj; bjhz;Lfis bra;J thGgth;fs;(Page 66)."
46. It was submitted that the temple administration was directly under the control of Kings and as such 'Thillai' was called (;jdpa{h; bgUk;gw;w g[ypa{h;).  It was submitted that one or two officials deputed by Kings used to stay at 'Thillai'  and supervised the temple administration.  The temple staff, people of Thillai and the dignitaries used to consult these officials and undertake various responsibilities.  This is said to be evident from the rock inscriptions of King Koperunsingan I period.
@bjhz;ilkhDk; jpUitahWilahDk; kJuhe;jfg; gpukuhaDk; MSilahh; nfhapYf;Fr; rKjha jpUkhspiff; TW jpy;iyak;gyg; gy;ytuhaDk; rPfhhpa"; bra;thh;fSk; rKjha"; bra;thh;fSk; nfhapy; ehaf"; bra;thh;fSk; jpUkhspiff; TW bra;aj; jpUtha; bkhHpe;jUspdgo (Page 126)."

47. The informations contained in the book and the various informations said to be available in the temple would clearly indicate that the temple was administered by the persons appointed by Kings and Dikshidars were only looking after the pooja services relating to the temple.


48. Assuming that the observations of the Division Bench remains unchallenged, such observation might hold good only for Podhu Dikshidars.  Since there is nothing to show that Podhu Dikshidars have established the temple, Sri Sabanayagar temple is shown to be a 'denominational temple'.

49. Regulations in administration of properties:-
    Whether appointment of Executive Officer is an infringement of the Constitutional rights of Podhu Dikshidars?
Without accepting the contention of the Writ Petitioner and assuming for the sake of arguments that the temple is a 'denominational temple', as per Article 26 every 'religious denomination' or section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs only in matters of religion.

50. The point falling for consideration is whether appointment of Executive Officer infringes the Constitutional right of the Podhu Dikshidars.

51. The language of the two clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 would at once bring out the difference between the two.  In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of the management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away.  On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a 'religious denomination' is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law.  This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust property by means of laws validly enacted; but here again it should be remembered that under Article 26 (d), it is the religious denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with law.  A law, which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which is guaranteed by Article 26 (d) of the Constitution [Vide AIR 1954 SC 282 Commissioner Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra Swaminar & (1983) 1 SCC 51 S.P.Mittal v. Union of India].

52. The distinction between right of 'religious denomination' to manage its affairs in matters of religion and to acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the celebrated judgment in Sri Shirur Mutt case [1954 SCR 1005].  In Para  (17) of the judgment, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-
" 17. It will be seen that besides the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, which is given by clause (b), the next two clauses of article 26 guarantee to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law.  The administration of its property by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.  The latter is a fundamental right which no legislature can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose.  It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the article applies.  What then are matters of religion?  The word "religion" has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition.
 In an American case [Davis v. Benson, 133 U.S. 333], it has been said "that the term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His will.  It is often confounded with cults of form or worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter."  We do not think that the above definition can be regarded as either precise or adequate.  Articles 25 and 26 of our Constitution are based  for the most part upon article 44 (2) of the Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of "religion" as given above could have been in the minds of our Constitution-makers when they framed the Constitution.  Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic.  There are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause.  A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a  doctrine or belief.  A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress."

53. In (1996) 2 SCC 498 [Pennalal Bansilal Pitti and others v. State of A.P. and another], Supreme Court had pointed out the distinction between clause (b) and (d) of Article 26 of Constitution thus:-
" 19. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay [1954 SCR 1055 : AIR 1954 SC 388], this Court further had pointed out the distinction between clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 thus: In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away.  On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property, but only in accordance with law.  This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted; but here again it should be remembered that under Article 26 (d), it is the religious denomination or general body of religion itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State may validly impose.  A law which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which is guaranteed by Article 26 (d) of the Constitution.  In that case, the Court found that the exercise of the power by the Charity Commissioner or the Court to divert the trust property or funds for purposes which he or it considered expedient or proper, although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out, was an unwarranted encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs.

20. It would thus be clear that the right to establish a religious institution or endowment is a part of religious belief or faith, but its administration is a secular part which would be regulated by law appropriately made by the legislature.  The regulation is only in respect of the administration of the secular part of the religious institution or endowment, and not of beliefs, tenets, usages and practices, which are an integral part of that religious belief or faith."

54. The distinction between religious practice and secular activities of religious institution has been succinctly brought out in (1997) 8 SCC 422 [Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee, rep. through its Administrator and another v. Chintamani Khuntia and others].  Para (3) of the judgment reads as under:-
"3. Collection and distribution of money even though given as offerings to the deity cannot be a religious practice.  The offerings whether of money, fruits, flowers or any other thing are given to the deity.  It has been said in the Gita that "whoever offers leaf, flower, fruit or water to Me with devotion I accept that".  The religious practice ends with these offerings.  Collection and distribution of these offerings or retention of a portion of the offerings for maintenance and upkeep of the temple are secular activities.  These activities belong to the domain of management and administration of the temple.  We have to examine this case bearing this basic principle in mind.  The offerings made inside the Temple are known as Veta and Pindika.  Veta means the offerings that are given to Lord Jagannath at specified places in the Temple.  Pindika means offerings that are given on the pedestal of the deities."

55. Regarding maintenance of accounts by Mathadhipathi, matters arose for consideration under Andhra Pradesh HR & CE Act.  Observing that provisions of Andhra Pradesh HR & CE Act and administration of Mathadhipathi Rules, 1987 do not regulate propagation or preaching of the tenets of mahant or religious math and that those provision pertain to management, administration and maintenance of math, safeguarding interests which are secular activities, in (1996) 8 SCC 705 [Sri Sri Sri Lakshamana Yatendrulu and others v. State of A.P. and another], the Supreme Court held as under:-
" 43. ..... In law, he is enjoined as a trustee to account for the properties in his possession and is responsible for due management which is a secular act.  It is seen that the report of Justice Challa Kondaiah Commission had collected material that some Mahants had resorted to corrupt practices by diverting the funds of the math as Padakanukas and personal gifts and utilised the same to lead immoral or luxurious life or siphoning the income to the members of natural family to which he belonged or on wine and women.  The legislature on consideration thereof felt it expedient to remedy the evil and imposed a duty, which as trustee is enjoined on him.  Fastening an obligation on mathadhipathi to maintain accounts of the receipts of Padakanukas as personal gifts made to the mathadhipathi and to see that the funds are properly utilised for the purposes of the math in accordance with its objects and propagation of Hindu Dharma does not amount to interference with religion.  Equally, in respect of gifts of properties or money made to the mathadhipathi as gifts intended for the benefit of the math, he is bound under law as trustee, even without amendment to the Act, to render accounts for the receipts and disbursement and cause the accounts in that behalf produced from time to time before the Commissioner or any authorised person in that behalf, whenever so required is part of administration of properties of the math.  Questions relating to administration of properties relating to math or specific endowment are not matters of religion under Article 26 (b).  They are secular activities though connected with religion enjoined on the Mahant."

56. Such distinction was also brought out in (1997) 4 SCC 606 [Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and others v. State of U.P. and others].  In the said decision, in Paras (27) and (31), the Supreme Court has held thus:-
" 27. The right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes or to administer property of such institutions in accordance with law was protected only in respect of such religious denomination or any section thereof which appears to extend help equally to all and religious practice peculiar to such small or specified group or section thereof as part of the main religion from which they got separated.  The denominational sect is also bound by the constitutional goals and they too are required to abide by law; they are not above law.  Law aims at removal of the social ills and evils for social peace, order, stability and progress in an egalitarian society. .........
..............
31. The protection of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is not limited to matters of doctrine.  They extend also to acts done in furtherance of religion and, therefore, they contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of the religion.  In Seshammal case [(1972) 2 SCC 11] on which great reliance was placed and stress was laid by the counsel on either side, this Court while reiterating the importance of performing rituals in temples for the idol to sustain the faith of the people, insisted upon the need for performance of elaborate ritual ceremonies accompanied by chanting of mantras appropriate to the deity.  This Court also recognised the place of an archaka and had held that the priest would occupy place of importance in the performance of ceremonial rituals by a qualified archaka who would observe daily discipline imposed upon him by the Agamas according to tradition, usage and customs obtained in the temple. .......   It is not every aspect of the religion that requires protection of Articles 25 and 26 nor has the Constitution provided that every religious activity would not be interfered with.  Every mundane and human activity is not intended to be protected under the Constitution in the garb of religion.  Articles 25 and 26 must be viewed with pragmatism.  By the very nature of things it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define the expression 'religion' or 'matters of religion' or 'religious beliefs or practice'.  Right to religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 is not absolute or unfettered right to propagate religion which is subject to legislation by the State limiting or regulating every non-religious activity.  The right to observe and practice rituals and right to manage in matters of religion are protected under these articles.  But right to manage the Temple or endowment is not integral to religion or religious practice or religion as such which is amenable to statutory control.  These secular activities are subject to State regulation but the religion and religious practices which are an integral part of religion are protected.  It is a well-settled law that administration, management and governance of the religious institution or endowment are secular activities and the State could regulate them by appropriate legislation.  This Court upheld the A.P. Act which regulated the management of the religious institutions and endowments and abolition of hereditary rights and the right to receive offerings and plate collections attached to the duty." [underlining added]

57. In the light of the well-settled principles if we examine the instant case,  Podhu Dikshidars can claim protection under Article 25 of Constitution.  It may be that form of worship may be protected under Article 25 and 26 (a) of Constitution.  But right to manage the temple or offerings or Kattalais [endowment] are not integral to religion or religious practice and as such are amenable to statutory control.  As has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the secular activities are subject to statutory control.   When examined in the light of the well-settled principles, Podhu Dikshidars are not entitled to the protection in particular clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 of Constitution as 'religious denomination' in the matter of management, administration and governance of the temple under the Act.  As such appointment of Executive Officer is not ultra vires the Article 25 and 26 of Constitution of India.  The contention that appointment of Executive Officer is violative of Article 25 (b) and (d) of the Constitution is untenable and devoid of substance.

58. Whether appointment of Executive Officer is in accordance with Sec.45 (1) of HR & CE Act:-
By the order dated 20.07.1982, Commissioner has pointed out several irregularities in the administration of the temple and its properties and the proposal to appoint Executive Officer.  In W.P.No.5638/1982, by the order dated 08.08.1983, learned single Judge directed that the aforesaid notice would be treated only as a show cause and not as a decision to appoint  Executive Officer.

59. After hearing Podhu Dikshidars, Commissioner has passed an order on 31.07.1987 meeting all the legal aspects.  By the order dated 31.07.1987, Commissioner has observed "appointment of Executive Officer is only to look after the administration of the temple and for management of the properties and for better administration of the temple and to realise the income due from them so that income may be appropriated for the purpose in which endowments were created.  That order was again challenged by Podhu Dikshidars in W.P.No.7843/1987.

60. W.P.No.7843/1987 was dismissed on 17.2.1987.  Challenging the dismissal order, W.A.No.145/1997 was filed which was disposed of with a direction to the Writ Petitioner to file Revision under Sec.114 of HR & CE Act.  Revision filed by Podhu Dikshidars was rejected by the impugned G.O.(D) No.168 TDC & RE Dept. dated 09.5.2006.

61. Section 45 of the Act could not be taken to confer an unguided or arbitrary power on the Commissioner.  The power under the Section has got to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act, i.e., to provide for administration and governance of the religious and charitable institutions and endowments under the State.  Power under Sec.45 of the Act can be and has to be exercised by the Commissioner appropriately in such a case.  The power vested in the Commissioner being a drastic one, it has to be exercised cautiously, reasonably and fairly as the exercise of such power may even result in the effective elimination of the hereditary trustee from the management and administration of the institution.  Therefore it is, that natural justice and fair play require that the Commissioner should properly exercise the power under Sec.45 (1) of the Act, after being satisfied that the institution is not properly managed and the administration requires to be toned up or improved.

62. On behalf of the Writ Petitioner, Mr. B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel contended that Executive Officer can be appointed in respect of 'religious denominational temple'.  Executive Officer can be appointed only when there is gross mismanagement and no such specific instances have been stated in the show cause notice dated 20.7.1982.  Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that in any event, the grounds alleged in the notice dated 20.7.1982 have become stale and no justifiable grounds are made out for appointing the Executive Officer.  Placing reliance upon AIR 1996 SC 3567 [Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram Committee and others v. Commissioner, HR & CE Dept. and others], it was contended that only in cases of gross mismanagement, Executive Officer could be appointed and the impugned order dated 31.7.1987 is not in accordance with Sec.45 of HR & CE Act.

63. In the order dated 31.07.1987 while referring to the appointment of Executive Officer, the Commissioner observed "having regard to such large scale allegations of maladministration which are supported by various materials, there is every justification for the appointment of an Executive Officer in terms of Section 45 of the Act".  Pointing out that the instances of maladministration would justify the appointment of Executive Officer, Commissioner, HR & CE referred to the decision AIR 1976 Mad. 264 [M.E.Subramani and others v. The Commissioner, HR & CE (Admn.), Madras and others].

64. Learned Senior Counsel for the Writ Petitioner contended that the order of the Commissioner is liable to be set aside as he has relied upon  AIR 1976 Mad. 264  which was overruled by the Division Bench in the judgment in 1995-2-LW-213 [K.Ekambaram, M.Kailasam v. The Commissioner, HR & CE (Admn.), Madras-24 and others].  It was further submitted that after analysing Sec.45 (1) of HR & CE Act, Division Bench has held that even if the Executive Officer is sought to be appointed for better management of the religious institution, still it could be done only if there are material for coming to the conclusion that there are acts of gross mismanagement or the properties of the institution being mis-managed.  Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the views of the Division Bench in  1995-2-LW-213 was reiterated by another Division Bench in 2007-1-LW 72 [N.Sivasubramanian v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary, HR & CE Dept. Chennai-9 and others].

65. In AIR 1976 Mad. 264 [M.E.Subramani and others v. The Commissioner, HR & CE(Admn.), Madras and others], Justice Ramanujam has observed as follows:-
"4. ..... Section 45 cannot be taken to confer an unguided and arbitrary power on the Commissioner and that the power has got to be exercised in terms of the policy of the Act i.e., to provide for the administration and governance of the religious and charitable institutions and endowments under the State of Tamil Nadu. ...... When the Commissioner has specifically stated, in the order appointing the Executive Officer, that the power has been exercised for the better and proper administration of the group of temples, it cannot say that this is, in any way, either irrelevant or extraneous and held that the impugned order passed by the Commissioner is in any way arbitrary."

66. In Subramani's case, the learned single Judge took the view that for better and proper administration of the temples, Executive Officer could be appointed even without affording an opportunity. In that context, the decision AIR 1976 Mad. 264 was overruled by the Division Bench in 1995 -2 -LW 213.   Observing that Sec.45 (1) of the Act gives vast powers to the Commissioner, Division Bench held as follows:-
" 4. ..... When such a power is conferred, the scope and ambit of such power shall have to be determined with reference to other provisions contained in the Act and also the object which the Act intends to achieve and serve. ....."

67. Of course in the order dated 31.7.1987,  Commissioner has referred to the decision in AIR 1976 Mad. 264.  At that time when the order was passed on 31.07.1987, decision AIR 1976 Mad. 264 was not overruled.  Decision of Division Bench Judgment in 1995-2-LW 213 came to be passed subsequently.  Therefore, there was nothing wrong for the Commissioner in referring to the decision of Justice Ramanujam in AIR 1976 Mad. 264 which was then holding field.

68. Upon over all consideration of the alleged acts of maladministration, Commissioner satisfied himself as to the necessity of appointing Executive Officer which was duly considered by the Government before passing the impugned order.  In my considered view, reference to AIR 1976 Mad. 264 would not affect the order of the Commissioner dated 31.07.1987.

69. As pointed out earlier in W.P.No.5638/1982, Court has directed notice in Rc.No.52754/1982/B6 dated 20.07.1982 be treated as show cause notice.  Thereafter, Commissioner sent notice to the parties and afforded sufficient opportunity to the parties and then only passed the order on 31.7.1987.

70. Challenging the order of the Commissioner dated 31.07.1987, Mr. B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel inter alia raised the following contentions:-

Commissioner has not considered the merits of the matter nor discussed the evidence relating to the acts of mismanagement.
In the  order dated 31.07.1987, Commissioner has not pointed out any specific allegation nor given a specific instances of allegation of mismanagement.
Without pointing out any specific instance of mismanagement, Commissioner has adopted a new basis for appointment of Executive Officer by saying that for proper administration and better management, appointment of Executive Officer is necessitated.

71. Onbehalf of the Writ Petitioner, it was further argued that the order of the Commissioner dated 31.7.1987 and the confirmation of the same by the Government are liable to be set aside as it is firstly a serious violation of principles of natural justice and secondly such a course is not permissible in view of the order passed by the Court in W.P.No.5638/1982.  It was further argued that it is trite law after issuing show cause notice, the impugned order cannot change the basis and passed an order on the basis of certain aspects which was not mentioned in the show cause notice. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon    AIR 2001 SC 661 [Hindustan Lever Limited v. Director General (Investigation and Registration), New Delhi and another];  (2003) 11 SCC 693 [Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore v. Gammon Far Chems Ltd.] and (2005) 12 SCC 256 [Raj Kumar Mehrotra  v. State of Bihar and others].

72. Merits of the above contention is to be examined in the light of the object of Sec.45  of HR & CE Act.  Ordinarily in the case of a hereditary trustee in charge of an institution he is clothed with plenary powers in the matter of management as well as the administration of the temple in that he would be entitled to the possession of all the properties of the temple and to secure the income in cash and kind and in the shape of offerings, to make disbursements and to draw up a  budget and to exercise control over all the office holders and servants and be in charge of the temple and responsible for the  maintenance of the records, accounts and registers.  By the  appointment of Executive Officer under Sec.45 (1) of the Act coupled with conferment of powers, the  position of the trustee would be relegated to the  position of non-entity.


73. It is not as if the Commissioner cannot exercise power under Sec.45 (1) of the Act.  In a case where institution is under maladministration and mismanagement, Commissioner can exercise the power under Sec. 45 (1) of the Act.  In cases of  improper management by a temple / religious institution, it would be necessary for the Commissioner to appoint Executive Officer.  The exercise of that power depended not on the whims and fancies of the Commissioner, but upon the decisions arrived at on the facts of each case on application of mind by the Commissioner to the question whether Executive Officer is necessary in the interest of the institution.

74. Section 45  of  HR & CE Act could not be taken to confer an unguided or arbitrary power on the Commissioner.  Only if the Commissioner had exercised the power under Sec. 45 of the Act on extraneous ground or on irrelevant consideration, only then that exercise can be challenged as outside the purview of Sec.45 (1) of the Act.

75. Acts of mismanagement:-
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the order of the Commissioner dated 31.7.1987 appointing Executive Officer and the confirmation order of the Government dated 09.05.2006 are based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations.  It was mainly argued that by appointment of Executive Officer for better management, Commissioner has deviated from the direction of the High Court in W.P.No.5638/1982 and that there is paradigm shift in the order which would vitiate the impugned order of appointment of Executive Officer.

76. Of course in the order in W.P.No.5638/1982, it was directed to treat the order dated 20.7.1982 as show cause notice with a further direction to afford opportunity to both parties.  After affording opportunity to both parties, Commissioner has passed the order dated 31.07.1987 pointing many acts of mismanagement as indicated in the show cause notice dated 20.7.1982.  To mention a few:-
No proper maintenance of accounts for offerings to the temple and donations collected.
Missing / loss of number of gold jewels and other valuable items.
Unaccounted jewels / gold ingot kept by Podhu Dikshidars.  When called for explanation as to unaccounted jewels, Writ Petitioner claimed that they are not the temple jewels and therefore, there was no necessity to account for those jewels.
Enquiry revealed that many gold jewels were melted and gold ingots were made.

77. As pointed by the learned Addl. Advocate General that the charges contained in the show cause notice definitely attract  action under Sec.45 of the Act.  The show cause notice indicates several grave irregularities like (i) non-accounting of gold ingots and gold coins worth Rs.2.2 lakhs kept in the Karuvoolam and detected by the Asst. Commissioner, Cuddalore in the presence of RDO, Chidambaram and District Superintendent of Police; (ii) there was also loss of 860 grams of gold in melting the old jewels; (iii) non-accounting of gold Kanikkai articles received as Kanikkai to the temple.

78. Referring to various complaints of mismanagement and report of the Asst. Commissioner (dated 20.7.1982), the then Commissioner observed that for proper management of the temple and better administration, it was necessary to appoint an Executive Officer.  Based on various allegations of mismanagement and missing of gold jewels, the Commissioner felt it necessary to appoint an Executive Officer.

79. Ofcourse the situation and the alleged acts of mismanagement were entirely different from the one's placed before the Court when the Court passed an order in W.P.Nos.379 and 380/1951.  We may usefully refer to certain facts and the alleged acts of mismanagement which impelled the then Commissioner [show cause notice dated 20.7.1982] to propose to appoint Executive Officer which read as follows:-




VERNACULAR  ( TAMIL )  PORTION  DELETED




The alleged acts of mismanagement are writ-large on the face of it.  The acts of mismanagement are not imaginary one.

80. On the face of it, there are failure to perform the lawful duties as enjoined on them under Sec.28 of HR & CE Act.  The instances are:- (i) Petitioners have not maintained the accounts; (ii) Petitioners have not realised the income due to the temple; (iii) Offering to the God by the worshippers have not been accounted for by them as trustees; and (iv) Missing / loss of gold jewels.

81. After hearing the parties and upon examination of the allegation of mismanagement, Commissioner was satisfied  to appoint Executive Officer to streamline the administration of the temple.   In the order dated 31.7.1987, though Commissioner may not have referred to each and every one of the alleged acts of mis-mangement and maladministration, having regard to the nature of allegations, Commissioner was justified in exercising power under Sec.45 (1) of the Act to appoint Executive Officer for better management and administration of the temple.

82. From the submissions of the learned Addl. Advocate General, it comes to be known that Special Tahsildar was appointed by the Department to investigate the temple properties and to take necessary steps to obtain lease deeds to an extent of 396.37 acres of lands in the name of the temple fixing the annual rent payable to the temple by the tenant.  Only on account of neglect of duty on the part of Writ Petitioners in not taking proper and effective action to realise the income due to the temple from the properties of the temple, Special Tahsildar was appointed to manage the immovable properties.  It is stated that in fact, electricity charges of the temple are not met by Podhu Dikshidars; but are being actually paid by the Special Tahsildar from the collection of the lease amount.
83. Learned Addl. Advocate General would also submit that Writ Petitioners have not taken action for the enforcement of Kattalais which have not been performed as per the scales of expenditure provided by the Founder of Kattalais.   Under Sec.38 (2) of HR & CE Act, in case of specific endowment attached to the temple, the Commissioner is empowered to require the person responsible in law for the enforcement of Kattalais, provided for by the Founder of the Kattalais.  On behalf of the Respondents, it was submitted that since Podhu Dikshidars have continuously neglected to perform their duty, it has become necessary to appoint Tahsildar to identify the lands belonging to the temple and several Kattalais attached to the temple and set in motion the action to realise the income due to the temple.

84. Learned Addl. Advocate General has also submitted that Kumbabishekam of the temple was performed on 11.2.1987 by the Renovation Committee.  Large scale of renovation works were carried out in the temple through the Renovation Committee approved by HR & CE Board at a cost of Rs.46 lakhs, out of which Government grants were Rs.20 lakhs and diversion of funds from other temples were Rs.6 lakhs and public donations through sale of tickets were about Rs.20 lakhs.  It was further submitted that performance of Kumbabishekam of the temple under the guidance of HR & CE Board would clearly indicate the interest evinced by HR & CE in proper administration of the temple.

85. If the worshippers offered contribution either in cash  or kind personally, there must be responsible officer having its office premises in the temple to issue official receipt.  As consistently held by the Supreme Court that there is clear distinction between performance of poojas and rituals in the temple and proper maintenance of offerings to the deity which is the property of the temple.  While the performance of poojas and rituals are protected under Article 26 (a) of Constitution, the matter of administration of the properties are to be in accordance with law and exercising the power under Sec.45 (1) of HR & CE Act, such secular activities could be regulated.

86. As pointed out earlier, the income derived from various stalls in the temple and collection of entrance fee for Dharshan and Aarathanai are issued in a piece of paper without indicating funds value and the income from collections for performance of other Abishekam are said to have been not properly accounted for.  Petitioners cannot abdicate their responsibility in maintenance of accounts and administration of the temple.
87. As has been held by the Supreme Court in various judgments that the administration and maintenance of the temple is purely a secular act and so the State can intervene and regulate the administration for proper management and better administration.  If the secular activities of the institution have been mis-managed, appointment of Executive Officer to the institutions (even assuming that it is 'religious denomination') would be permissible.

88. Executive Officer was appointed only to streamline the administration of the temple and not to dislocate Podhu Dikshidars from the temple.  Pursuant to the order passed in Rc.No.52754/82/L1 dated 31.7.1987, R.Jayachandran, Grade-I Executive Officer was appointed as Executive Officer of Arulmighu Sabanayagar temple.   Proceedings in Rc.No.52754/82/L1 dated 05.8.1987 contains Appendix defining the powers and duties to be exercised and performed respectively by the Executive Officer and Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars.  By reading of Appendix, it is seen that the Executive Officer was put in custody of all immovable, livestocks, grains and other valuables.  Executive Officer shall be responsible for the collection of all income and moneys due to the institution.  Executive Officer has to function in coordination with the Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars.  In fact, as seen from the Rule 15 Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars shall have power to operate on Bank Accounts, but cheque book and pass book shall remain in the custody of the Executive Officer.  Rule 15 to the Appendix reads as follows:-
RULE 15 : The Secretary Podhu Deekshithar shall have power to operate on the Bank Accounts, but the cheque book and the pass book shall remain in the custody of the Executive Officer.  The Executive Officer shall have separate account in his name as provided under Rule 4 (b) of these rules and the same shall be operated upon by him.

89. Apart from the allowable expenditure, the other expenditure by the Executive Officer would be with the approval of Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars.  Rule 4 (d), (e) and Rule 5 reads as follows:-
RULE 4(d) : For meeting unforeseen expenditure, the Executive Officer shall have such permanent advances as may be fixed by the Deputy Commissioner.  The Executive Officer shall not incur any expenditure which exceeds Rs.10/- without obtaining prior sanction of the trustees.  In cases of emergency, he may incur expenditure, but shall without delay, obtained the approval of the Secretary, Podhu Deekshitar.
RULE 4(e) : The accounts of all receipts and expenditure in month shall be placed before the Secretary of Podhu Deekshithar of the monthly meetings being passed by them.
RULE 5 : The Executive Officer shall prepare the budget in sufficient, obtain the  approval and submit it for sanction.   Similarly supplemental budget and proposals for ratification of expenditure incurred in excess of the budget sanction due to extraordinary circumstances should also be submitted through the Podhu Deekshithar.

90. As seen from Rule 6 (a), all the Office holders and servants shall work under the immediate control and superintendence of Executive Officer subject to the disciplinary control of the Secretary of Podhu Dikshidars under Sec.56 of HR & CE Act.  It is not as if by the appointment of Executive Officer, Podhu Dikshidars are displaced from the temple in performance of rituals or administration.  Only for better management and administration, it has been stipulated in the Rules that both Executive Officer and Podhu Dikshidars are to function in co-operation with each other.  Thus, it is clear that there is clear demarcation of the powers to be exercised by the Executive Officer and Podhu Dikshidars.

91. Regarding various allegations of mismanagement, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that jewel verifications were done every year and that so far, no complaints had been received.  Drawing Court's attention to the annual jewel verifications done, learned Senior Counsel submitted that as such there was no complaints.  Insofar as, missing or alleged loss of gold jewels, learned Senior Counsel submitted that Dikshidars have explained as they have invested in gold bonds.

92. Exercising judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution, this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to re-analyse the facts and evidence.  Suffice it to note that there are serious allegations of mismanagement regarding the jewels.  The annual jewel verification pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel are just only verification.  The annual verification report would only state "kw;w tptu';fSf;F mwpf;ifapy; fhz;f@/  Therefore, it cannot be said that in the annual jewel verification, Podhu Dikshidars have given clean chit.


93. The other aspects submitted by the learned Addl. Advocate General, and Mr. R.Gandhi, Senior Counsel [appearing for the impleading Petitioners] are to be noted.  Learned Addl. Advocate General would submit that the other temples are showing considerably good income.  For instance Kabaleeswarar Koil, Mylapore is said to be having an income around Rs.10 Crores per annum.  Whereas Sri Sabanayagar temple, Chidambaram though internationally renowned having world wide devotees have shown only an amount of  few thousands (Rs.37,199/-) as the annual income for the year 2007.  Out of which, expenditure is shown to be Rs.37,000/- and the balance in hand is shown only Rs.199/-.  The very statement of accounts for the year 2007 would prima facie indicate that the income of the temple was not properly accounted for and proper accounts are not maintained.

94. The acts of mismanagement and lack of proper administration is writ-large on the face of it.  Having regard to the nature of allegations of mismanagement, by the order dated 31.7.1987, Commissioner has rightly ordered appointment of Executive Officer.  Proceedings in Rc.No.52754/82/L1 dated 05.8.1987 contain Rules for exercise of powers and duties both by Executive Officer and Podhu Dikshidars respectively.  The order has not infringed the rights of Podhu Dikshidars nor violative of provision of HR & CE Act warranting interference.

95. Yet another aspect is relevant to be noted.  Mr. R.Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner placed reliance upon G.O.Ms.No.53 Tamil Development Religious Charitable Endowments and Information Dept. dated 29.2.2008 wherein Government has passed an order permitting any devotee can become a Archaga, irrespective of caste and colour.  On the basis of the said G.O., impleading Petitioner made an attempt to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambala Medai and that Podhu Dikshidars had filed suit in O.S.No.176/2006 against the impleading Petitioner.  As pointed out earlier, refusal to allow the Impleading Petitioner Arumugasamy to recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam inside the temple had led to a serious dispute and number of litigations.

96. Government have passed G.O.Ms.No.53 Tamil Development Religious Charitable Endowments and Information Dept. dated 29.2.2008 wherein it was stated that devotees can recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambal Medai without paying any cost to Podhu Dikshidars.  The fact that inspite of such G.O., impleading Petitioner was not allowed to peacefully recite Devaram and Thiruvasagam at Thiruchitrambala Medai is to be reckoned with.

97. Contending that worshippers' right will always prevail over the individual rights [Podhu Dikshidars], learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.Gandhi placed reliance upon AIR 1954 SC 282 [The Commr. HR & CE, Madras];  1997 (8) SCC 422 [Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee, rep. through its Administrattor and another v. Chintamani Khuntia and others]; 1997 (2) SCC 745 [Bhuri Nath and others v. State of J & K and others]; 1996 (2) SCC 498 [Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and others v. State of A.P. and another].   As per the said Government Order, reciting Devaram and Thiruvasagam inside the temple is a valuable right of devotees.

98. As rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner, Government is fighting for secular right and the impleading Petitioner is seeking for worshipping right.  Impleading Petitioner has fundamental right to worship in the temple as guaranteed by the Constitution and enforce the right as well as to implement the Government Order in  G.O.Ms.No.53 Tamil Development Religious Charitable Endowments and Information Dept. dated 29.2.2008.  By narration of various dates and events, it is seen that impleading Petitioner has been continuously fighting for  upkeep of the traditions in the temple and to protect the worshipping rights.  Impleading Petitioner as a worshipper has every right to espouse the cause of other worshippers.  To substantiate the same, learned Senior Counsel for the impleading Petitioner would place reliance upon 2008 (8) MLJ 365 [Bibijan and 49 others v. Anwarsha Idgah & Mosque Avuila Durga, Panruti and 70 others]. Therefore, the impleading Petitioner is ordered to be impleaded for better adjudication of facts and circumstances of the case.

99. Before parting with the matter, this Court constrained to point out number of litigations and the delay in implementation of the order.  Though the order appointing Executive Officer was passed way back in 1982, it is unfortunate that Podhu Dikshidars have filed Writ Petitions after Writ Petitions challenging the same and thereby delaying process of giving effect to the order.  Ultimately, causality is the proper management and administration of the temple.

100. As pointed out earlier, in the Appendix to the Office Proceedings No.52754/82/L1 dated 05.8.1987, there is demarcation of powers of Executive Officer and Podhu Dikshidars and their responsibilities.  If both the Executive Officer and Podhu Dikshidars act as per the Rules in the Appendix, it would ensure better management and administration apart from ensuring worshippers' right.

101. This court expresses the hope that at least from now on, the vast properties of Sri Sabanayagar temple, Chidambaram is to be taken into proper management and administration.  This Court expresses the hope that Podhu Dikshidars would co-operate with the authorities in proper management and administration of the temple and its properties.

102. M.P.No.2/2006 and M.P.No.1/2008 :-
   In the result, both the Petitions are allowed and the Petitioners in M.P.No.2/2006 & M.P.No.1/2008 are ordered to be impleaded in the Writ Petition as Respondents 3 and 4 respectively.  No costs.

103. W.P.No.18248/2006:-
In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed.  Having regard to the interest of the temple, its management and administration,  the following directions are issued:-
2nd Respondent shall issue appropriate directions to the Executive Officer Mr. R.Jayachandran or the present Executive Officer to administer Sri Sabanayagar Temple, Chidambaram in accordance with the provisions of HR & CE Act and the Appendix to the Office Proceedings No.52754/82/L1 dated 05.8.1987 within a period of one week from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Writ Petitioner  Podhu Dikshidars shall render all co-operation to the Executive Officer in the proper administration of the temple in accordance with the Rules stipulated in the Appendix to the Office Proceedings  No.52754/82/L1 dated 05.8.1987.

Status quo granted on 17.6.2006 in M.P.No.1/2006 is vacated.

No costs.




bbr


To

1. The State of Tamil Nadu
    rep. by Secretary,
    Department of Tamil Development,
    Religious Endowments & Information
    Department,
    Fort St. George, Chennai-9.

2. The Commissioner,
    Hindu Religious Endowments,
    Nungambakkam High Road,
    Chennai 34